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Abstract
Both a popular lifestyle drug and an herbal remedy have recently been recalled due to concerns of safety.
1In the wake of these recalls, reforms were proposed to strengthen the FDA’s post-marketing enforcement
powers and resources. The emphasis on post-marketing enforcement is not surprising as the eﬀectiveness
of pre-market approval is reaching its limitations for the markets of both lifestyle drugs and herbal reme-
dies. Moreover, consumer conceptions of both markets are conceptually converging, requiring the need for
more consistent regulations. The FDCA provides suﬃcient post-marketing enforcement power over lifestyle
drugs, but not for herbal remedies. An enhanced regulatory regime for herbal remedies would have the
additional beneﬁt of addressing the intellectual property issues that have plagued the full development of
herbal remedies.
2Introduction
The front cover of the May 11, 1998 issue of BusinessWeek heralded “The New Era of Lifestyle Drugs” and
predicted that drugs such as Viagra would transform the pharmaceutical industry.1 BusinessWeek observed
that the pharmaceutical industry was shifting; where once the industry on focused on life-threatening con-
ditions, it has now turned its attention to conditions that are merely uncomfortable, and where treatment
could be considered optional. The shift was being driven in part by the changing demographics of the United
States: “baby boomers would gladly pay to pop a pill rather than diet, exercise, watch their cholesterol – or
do without sex.”2
While term “lifestyle drug” is used frequently in scientiﬁc literature and the popular media, there is no
consensus on an exact deﬁnition.3 A reasonable working deﬁnition, suggested in an article in the British
Medical Journal, is that a lifestyle drug is a drug “used for ‘nonhealth’ problems or for problems that lie at
the margins of health and wellbeing” or one “used for health problems that might be better treated by a
change in lifestyle[.]4 This deﬁnition would include not only drugs for conditions such as erectile dysfunc-
tion, such as Viagra, but also drugs that reduce high cholesterol, or heart burn, as these conditions could
arguably also be treated by adjustments to lifestyle by altering diet and increasing exercise. Even with this
working deﬁnition, line between “lifestyle” and “traditional” drug is by no means clear-cut and has been the
subject of debate over the boundaries between therapy and enhancement; disease and the realities of aging.5
However, lifestyle drugs may be perhaps be characterized by their shared characteristics: prolonged use for
1Joseph Weber et. al, The New Era of Lifestyle Drugs, BusinessWeek, Apr. 28, 2003, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/1998/19/b3577001.htm
2See id.
3Claus Møldrup, The Use of the Terms ‘Lifestyle Medicines’ or “Lifestyle Drugs,” 26 Pharm World Sci 193, 195 (2004).
4David Gilbert et. al., Lifestyle Medicines, 325 Brit. Med. J. 321, 321 (2000)
5See e.g., Joel Lexchinm, Lifestyle Drugs, Issues for Debate, 164 Canadian Med. Assn. J. 1449, 1449-51 (2001)
3common conditions that lie at the boundary of enhancement and treatment.
BusinessWeek has largely proven clairvoyant. The era of lifestyles drugs has arrived, at least based on sales
of pharmaceuticals. In 2005, the top ﬁve of the best selling prescription drugs in the United States could be
classiﬁed as lifestyle drugs. Lipitor, which treats high cholesterol, and had the highest sales, at $8.4 billion,
followed by, Zocor, which also treats cholesterol, at $4.4 billion. The third and fourth top selling, Nexium
and Prevacid, both treat heartburn, and the ﬁfth, Advair Diskus, treats asthma; sales were $4.4 billion, $3.8
billion, and $3.6 billion respectively. 6 While the epitome lifestyle drug, Viagra, was not in a top twenty, it
still accounted for $1.6 billion of revenue for Pﬁzer in 2005.7
While not receiving top billing on the front cover, herbal remedies have also received attention from Busi-
nessWeek. The April 28, 2003 issue contained an article with the headline “Herbal Remedies: A $4 Billion
Enigma.”8 Declaring the next decade as the era of herbal remedies would be somewhat ethnocentric, as
herbal and botanical products have been used by humans throughout history, having a central role in the
traditional medicines of the cultures of China,9 South Asia,10 and the Middle-East,11 well as indigenous
peoples.12 While herbal remedies may have been widely used in other cultures and countries, it has only
recently found popularity in the United States. A telephone survey conducted in 1991 found that only 2.5%
of the U.S. adult population used herbal products in the past 12 months13 A follow-up survey conducted in
6See Matthew Herper, The Best-Selling Drugs In America (Feb. 27, 2006),
http://www.forbes.com/sciencesandmedicine/2006/02/27/pﬁzer-merck-genentech-cx mh 0224topsellingdrugs.html
7Pzifer Inc., Annual Report 2005, 10-K 13 (ﬁled Mar. 1, 2006) available at
http://www.pﬁzer.com/pﬁzer/annualreport/2005/ﬁnancial/ﬁnancial2005.pdf
8See John Carey, Herbal Remedies: A $4 Billion Enigma?, BusinessWeek, April 28, 2003,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/03 17/b3830095 mz025.htm
9See e.g., Weishi Li, Botanical Drugs: A Future for Herbal Medicines, 19 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 117, 118-27
(2002) (describing the use of botanical products in traditional Chinese medicines)
10See e.g., Sita Reddy, Asian Medicine in America: The Ayurvedic Case, 583 The Annals Am. Acad. Pol. And Social
Sci. 97, 100-106 ) (providing a brief overview of Ayruvedic medicine)
11See Bashar Saad et. al., Tradition and Perspectives of Arab Herbal Medicine: A Review, 2 Evid Based Complement
Alternat Med, 475, 475-479 (2005)
12See e.g., Michael J. Huft, Indigenous Peoples and Drug Discovery Research, A Question of Property Rights, 89 N.W.U. L.
Rev. 1678, 1695-1704 (2005) (describing the use of herbal medicines in indigenous cultures)
13See David M. Eisenburg et. al., Unconventional mMdicine in the United States. Prevalence, Costs, and Patterns of Use,
328 New Eng. J. Med. 246, 246-251 (1993)
41997 found that the use of herbal products within the past 12 months had increased to 12.1%.14 And a sub-
sequent questionnaire based study in 2002 found that the prevalence of use of herbal medical had increased
to18.1%.15 These consumers spent an estimated $4.2 billion on herbal and botanical medicines in 2001.16
Both lifestyle drugs and herbal remedies are regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The
regulations, however, are vastly diﬀerent. Lifestyle drugs are regulated as “new drugs” and as such, subject
to extensive FDA oversight, including pre-market approval. Herbal remedies are typically regulated as “di-
etary supplements,” and as a result subject to substantially far less regulatory oversight, with no pre-market
approval. These regulatory regimes persist despite the converging uses for lifestyle drugs and herbal reme-
dies, and despite potentially similar if not identical active compounds. Ironically, part of the convergence
is driven by the bi-polar regulatory schemes. Equally ironic, the bi-polar regulatory schemes have resulted
safety concerns after the withdrawal of both a popular and widely used lifestyle drug and herbal remedy.
These withdrawals led to Congressional hearings on the role of the FDA and the adequacy of its regulations.
And as a ﬁnal bit of irony, the recommendations for regulatory reform in both cases was the same: more ag-
gressive post-marketing regulation through increased monitoring for adverse health eﬀects and withdrawals
of unsafe products from the market.
For lifestyle drugs, increased post-marketing surveillance and withdrawal represents a regulatory adaptation
to the speciﬁc characteristics of lifestyle drugs. For herbal remedies, however, the provisions under current
regulations for increased postmarketing surveillance and withdrawals are insuﬃcient. A new regulatory
14See David M. Eisenburg, Trends in alternative Medicine Use in the United States, 1990-1997: Results of a Follow-up
National Survey. 280 JAMA 1569, 1572 (1998)
15See Hilary A. Tindle et. al, Trends in the Use of Complementary and Alternative Medicine by U.S. Adults: 1997-2002,
Alternative Therapies 42, 47 (2005)
16See Donald M. Marcus &Arthur P. Grollman, Botanical Medicines – the Need for New Regulations, New Eng. J. of Med.
2073, 2073 (2002); see also Weber supra note 1 (noting that herbal remedies are a $4 billion per year industry).
5regime is needed to enable the FDA to balance the demands of protecting the safety of consumers, and
providing consumers with access to beneﬁcial medicines. One such system could be the use of a licensing
system, similar to the current drug approval system for lifestyle drugs. Such a system not only provides the
FDA the ﬂexibility necessary to eﬀectively regulate herbal remedies, but also provides has the potential to
unlock the full potential of herbal remedies by providing a solution to one of its most perplexing dilemmas
– the protection of intellectual property rights of natural plant medicines.
6Regulation of Lifestyle Drugs
Brief History of Drug Regulation
The ﬁrst major and comprehensive regulation of drugs began with the Food and Drug Act of 1906. (the
“1906 Act”)17 The 1906 Act adopted a reactive, policing model for regulating drugs. Moreover, after the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Johnson,18 the FDA had to not only demonstrate that the
product failed to work as claimed, but that manufacturer or distributor had knowledge that the claims were
false.19 The deﬁciencies in the 1906 Act became apparent in 1937 with the “Elixir Sulfanilamide” where the
solvent diethylene glycol, a poison, had been used to dissolve sulfanilamide, a drug used to treat streptococcal
infections.20 As the elixir had not been pre-tested, the use of the poisonous solvent was undetected until
it had killed over 100 people in ﬁfteen states.21 The tragedy prompted Congress to pass the Food Drug
and Cosmetic Act. (the “FDCA”) of 1938,22 which required that manufacturers of new drugs notify the
FDA prior to marketing, and give the FDA up to 180 days to review the drug for safety.23 In 1962 ,
Congress amended the FDCA in the wake of the thalidomide tragedy. Thalidomide had been widely used
in Europe as a sedative by pregnant women, but such use was later found to cause birth defects, including
the development ﬂipper-like limbs in the fetus.24 The 1962 amendments to the FDCA converted the pre-
notiﬁcation system of the 1938 Act to a pre-approval system, requiring the FDA to aﬃrmatively approve
17ch. 3915,34 Stat. 768 (1907)
18United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911)
19Richard A. Merrill, Symposium on Regulating Medical Innovation: The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical
Products, 82 VA L. Rev, 1753, 1757-61 (1996)
20See Caroline Bellentine, Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death, The 1937 Elixir Sulfanilamide Incident,
http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/elixir.html
21See id.
22ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
23505(b)-(c), 52 Stat. at 1052
24See Merrill, supra note 19 at n35
7each new drug. In addition, manufacturers were now required to show not only safety, but eﬀectiveness and
safety and eﬀectiveness needed to be demonstrated through “adequate and well-controlled studies.”25
Overview of the Current Drug Regulations
All drugs, including “traditional” and “lifestyle” drugs, are regulated by the under the same provisions of
the FDCA. A drug is deﬁned as a “new drug” and requires the submission of a new drug application (NDA)
and pre-market approval from the FDA, 26 unless it “generally recognized as safe and eﬀective” (GRAS/E)
and has been used for a material extent and material time. 27 The hurdle for a drug to be considered
GRAS/E is substantial and generally requires the types of scientiﬁc, well-controlled studies necessary to
obtain pre-market approval for a new drug.28 Moreover, the FDA has the jurisdiction to determine whether
a drug is a “new drug” subject to only minimal judicial review under 29
Regulation as a New Drug
To receive pre-market approval for the marketing of a new drug, the manufacturer, or other sponsor, must
submit a NDA to the FDA, 30 which must include data from clinical investigations detailing the safety
and eﬀectiveness of the drug.31 In order to conduct the necessary clinical trials to provide the data for
the NDA, the sponsor must also obtain FDA approval,32 by submitting an investigation new drug (IND)
25See id. at 176-79
2621 U.S.C. § 355
2721 U.S.C. § 321(p)
28See Margaret Gilhooley, Drug Regulation and the Constitution After Western States, 37 U. Rich. L. Rev. 901, 929 (2003)
29Weingerer v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 412, U.S. 645 (1973). Judicial review of the FDA determination is available
under the Administrative Procedures Act. 5 U. S. C. §§ 701-704. See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, 412 U.S.
609, 627 (1973)
3021 U.S.C. § 355(a)
3121 U.S.C. § 314.50(d)(5)
32FDA approval is required even for the clinical trials since a new drug cannot be distributed without a NDA. See 21 C.F.R.
8application.33 The IND application must include information on the safety of using the drug in the clinical
investigations, through pre-clinical pharmacological and toxicity studies in animals or in vitro,34 and a
description of the chemical and manufacturing processes.35 Clinical investigations are generally conducted
in three phases. Phase I studies typically consist of twenty (20) to eighty (80) people and are used to
determine the metabolism and pharmacology of the drug in humans so that the design of Phase II can be
optimized.36 Phase II studies are designed to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the drug and determine short-term
side-eﬀects and risks; Phase 2 typically consist of several hundred people.37 Phase III studies are designed
to assess safety and eﬀectiveness, evaluate the overall risk and beneﬁt of the drug, and determine the drug’s
labeling; Phase III usually require several hundred to several thousand people.38 Furthermore, the FDA can
also conditionally approve a new drug, by requiring that the sponsor conduct post-marketing studies, and
provide the FDA with annual reports on these studies.39
Regulation as OTC
Through the Over-The-Counter (OTC) Drug Review process, the FDA provided a process through which a
drug can be marketed with undergoing the extensive pre-market approval requirements of new drugs. The
FDA established the OTC Drug Review in 1972, in response to inadequacy and impracticality of case-by-
case determinations of the GRAS/E status of drugs.40 The review process is structured around monographs,
314.1.
3321 C.F.R. 314.20
3421 C.F.R. 312.23(a)(8)
3521 C.F.R. 312.23(a)(7)
3621 C.F.R. 312.21(a)
3721 C.F.R. 312.21(b)
3821 C.F.R. 312.21(c)
3921 U.S.C. § 356b(a); see also Other post-marketing reports, 21 C.F.R. 314.81
40See 37 Fed. Reg. 85; see also Peter B. Hutt & Richard A. Merill Food and Drug Law, Cases and Material 588-89
(1991);Robert G. Pinco, Implications of FDA’s Proposal to Include Foreign Marketing Experience in the Over-the-Counter
Drug Review Process, 54 Food Drug L.J. 105, 106-07 (1998)
9each corresponding to a speciﬁc therapeutic eﬀect (e.g. antacids, stimulants, cold remedies).41 Drugs falling
within a given monograph are reviewed by the monograph’s scientiﬁc advisory panel, which recommends
the conditions of use, if any, under which a particular drug is considered GRAS/E and not misbranded.42
Inclusion of a drug in a monograph is a determination that the drug is GRAS/E and not misbranded under
the conditions of use speciﬁed under the monograph.43 Moreover, only drugs that have been marketed for
a material extent and for a material time are eligible for inclusion in a monograph.44 Therefore, since the
inclusion of a drug that is in a monograph requires that the drug is both GRASE/E and has been marketed
for a material extent and time, the drug no longer meets the deﬁnition of “new drug” and can be marketed
without the submission and approval of a NDA.
While lifestyle drugs, given the prevalence and frequency of use, are arguably good candidates as OTC drugs,
they are typically not marketed under a directly under an OTC monograph without going through a NDA
process. A manufacturer, or any other interested person, may petition to amend an OTC monograph to
incorporate a drug, 45 Under the OTC review process, a drug is evaluated for safety and eﬀectiveness,46
which generally must be established by published studies. 47 There is little advantage of going directly to the
OTC monograph as proof of eﬀectiveness also requires the same type of adequate and well-controlled studies
necessary to demonstrate eﬀectiveness for approval for marketing approval under a NDA.48 If anything,
4121 C.F.R. 330.5
4221 C.F.R. 330.10
4321 C.F.R. 330.1
44The material extent / time eligibility criterion was established 21 C.F.R 330.14. See Additional Criteria and Procedures
for Classifying Over-the-Counter Drugs as Generally Recognized as Safe and Eﬀective and Not Misbranded, 67 Fed. Reg. 3060.
Prior to 21 C.F.R. 330.14 , the FDA has treated drugs which were marketed prior to December 4, 1975 as presumptively meeting
the material / time requirements of avoiding classiﬁcation as a “new drug.” See Pinco, supra note 40 at 108. Under 21 C.F.R.
330.14, a drug must be marketed continuously for at least ﬁve (5) years to meet the material extent / time criterion. 21 C.F.R.
330.14(c).
4521 C.F.R. 330.10(12)
46Id.
4721 C.F.R. 330.10(a)(4)
4821 C.F.R. 330.10(a)(4)(ii) (requiring that eﬀectiveness be determined 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b), which deﬁnes adequate and
well-controlled studies for approval under a NDA)
10marketing as an OTC drug entails additional, more stringent requirements as the drug must have been
marketed for a material extent and for a material time, and be safe for use without the supervision of a
physician.49 The novelty of a lifestyle drug means that it typically cannot establish the necessary history for
inclusion in an OTC monograph. Moreover, because evaluation for OTC status requires that a drug have a
low incidence of adverse eﬀects under conditions of widespread use,50 more studies are usually required to
gather the necessary data. Recently, drugs that have become OTC have predominately the result of a switch
from previously approved prescription status.51
Regulatory Blindspots of Lifestyle Drugs
Lifestyle drugs raise concerns over the adequacy of the current regulatory system for drugs. The pre-market
approval regulatory system that governs lifestyle drugs was designed in 1962, and thus did not envision
the coverage of lifestyle drugs. Instead, the regulations are best suited tailored for traditional drugs where
both the clinical endpoint and the length of use is well-deﬁned. In lifestyle drugs, however, the clinical
end-point, such as “lower cholesterol” may not always be universally deﬁned for everyone, but is instead a
relative measure. Moreover, the usage of lifestyle drugs is both more widespread and more frequent, and
thus statistically rare events could aﬀect a large number of people, in absolute terms. Given the practical
constraints on the size and length of clinical tests, many adverse events from lifestyle drugs could be lost in
the statistically noise.52
Regulation of Herbal Remedies
There are no speciﬁc provisions regulating traditional herbal medicines in the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act
49See 21 C.F.R. 330.14(b)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(B) (deﬁning criteria for requiring prescription )
5021 C.F.R. 330.10(a)(i)
51See David E. Collins, Report of the Task Force on the Future of OTC Drugs, 55 Food Drug L.J. 27, 27 (2000)
52See Michelle D. Roth-Cline, Clinical Trials in the Wake of Vioxx, 113 Circulation 2253, 2257-58 (2006)
11(FDCA). Herbal remedies can theoretically be regulated under the same drug provisions as drugs. Indeed,
the FDA has attempted address the application of drug regulations to herbal remedies.53 However, herbal
remedies typically also qualify for regulation as dietary supplements under the Dietary Supplement Health
and Education Act of 1994 (DSHEA).54 The regulatory regime applied to a given product is determined
by the manufacturer or distributor’s intended use.55 Intended use can be determined from any relevant
source, including claims in the product’s advertising and labeling.56 If the claims of the product include
the cure, treatment, mitigation, or prevention of disease, the herbal remedy will be regulated as a drug.57
However, under DSHEA, dietary supplements can make “structure/function” claims,58 and still be excluded
from regulation as a drug.59 In exchange for the prohibition on disease claims, a dietary supplements are
not subject to pre-market approval. Despite the FDA’s eﬀorts to adapt drug regulations to herbal remedies,
the availability of substantially less stringent regulatory regime of “dietary supplements” under DSHEA has
eﬀectively resulted in herbal remedies being regulated as dietary supplements.
Brief History of DSHEA
Congress passed DSHEA in 1994, concluding a series of battles between the FDA, Congress, and the courts
over the regulation dietary supplements.60 In 1973, the FDA promulgated regulations which would have
classiﬁed as drugs, any multivitamins with a dosage exceeding 150% of the recommended daily allowance.61
Enforcement of the regulations were suspended pending a challenge to the regulations in administrative
53See infra notes 252-
54Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325, codiﬁed in 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.
55United States v. Articles of Drug for Veterinary Use, 50 F.3d 497, 500 (8th Cir. 1995)
56Id.
57321 U.S.C. § 321(g)
58See infra
59See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (excluding dietary supplements from inclusion as a “drug” solely due to structurefunction, but not
disease claims if made in accordance with 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)), which, inter alia, bars dietary supplements from “claim[ing]
to diagnose, mitigate, treat, cure, or prevent a speciﬁc disease or class of diseases.”)
60See generally Michael A. McCann, Dietary Supplement Labeling: Cognitive Biases, Market Manipulation & Consumer
Choice, 31 Am. J. L. Med 215, 234-39 (2005) (describing the history of the FDA’s eﬀorts to regulate dietary supplements)
61Statements of General Policy or Interpretation, 38 Fed. Reg. 20713, 20717-18 (July 25, 1973)
12hearings.62 While the hearings were ongoing, Congress passed the Vitamin-Mineral Amendment of 1976,63
which prohibited the FDA from setting limits of the potency of vitamins or minerals, from regulating vitamins
and minerals as drugs solely on the basis of potency, and from limiting the combinations of vitamins.64
Despite being stymied in regulation, the FDA proceeded to take regulatory action against dietary supple-
ments through litigation. It attempted to seize a dietary supplement consisting of capsules containing black
current oil on the basis that the encapsulated oil was a food additive under 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) and therefore
required the manufacturer to demonstrate safety prior to marketing.65 The FDA asserted that a capsule’s
gelatin and glycerin, when combined with the black currant oil, resulted in the oil becoming a food additive,
even though the oil was not a food additive if un-encapsulated, and even though neither gelatin nor glycerin
were food additives.66 The Seventh Circuit disagreed, and found that FDA’s interpretation to be inconsis-
tent with the FDCA. The court found that the FDA’s interpretation would “arbitrarily classify a substance
as either food or food additive by how it is marketed rather than by the nature and use of the substance
itself.”67
In response to the FDA’s aggressive regulation of dietary supplements, and to lobbying by the dietary sup-
plements industry, Congress passed DSHEA in 1994.68 In passing DSHEA, Congress including ﬁndings that
“although the Federal Government should take swift action against products that are unsafe or adulterated,
the Federal Government should not take any actions to impose unreasonable regulatory barriers limiting
or slowing the ﬂow of safe products and accurate information to consumers”69 and that “legislative action
62Regulation of Dietary Supplements, Advanced Notice of Rulemaking, 58 Fed. Reg. 33690, 33693 (June 18, 1993)
63Pub. L. No. 94-278, 90 Stat. 410 (1976) (codifying 21 U.S.C. § 350)
6421 U.S.C. § 350(a) (2006); vitamins and minerals for children, and pregnant lactating women are exempt from the limitations.
See 21 U.S.C. § 350(b) (2006)
65See United States v. Two Plastic Drums, 984 F.2d 814, 816 (7th Cir. 1993)
66See id.
67See id. at 816-18
68McCann supra note 60 at 243-44
69108 Stat. 4325, s 2(13)
13that protects the right of access of consumers to safe dietary supplements is necessary in order to promote
wellness” and that “a rational Federal framework must be established to supersede the current ad hoc,
patchwork regulatory policy on dietary supplements.” 70 Thus, with DSHEA, Congress hoped to reign in
the FDA’s regulation of dietary supplements. In essence, as a result of DSHEA, dietary supplements are
regulated only somewhat more stringently than convention foods.71
Regulation of Herbal Remedies as Dietary Supplements
Herbal remedies usually fall under the deﬁnition of “dietary supplement.” DSHEA deﬁnes “dietary supple-
ment” broadly, to include “an herb or other botanical”72 as well as “a concentrate, metabolite, constituent,
extract, or combination” of the botanical or other dietary supplement. 73 An article that has been marketed
as a dietary supplement does not lose its status as a dietary supplement even if it is later approved to as a
new drug.74 However, an article that has been approved as a new drug prior to any marketing as a dietary
supplement is excluded from the deﬁnition of dietary supplement.75 Thus, an herbal remedy could lose its
status as an dietary supplement due simply to the timing of an NDA.
Dietary supplements are excluded from the deﬁnition of food additives, thereby precluding the possibility of
stricter regulation through classiﬁcation of dietary supplements as food additives.76 Unlike drugs and food
additives, dietary supplements are not subject to pre-market approval. Unless the dietary supplement also
meets the deﬁnition of a drug, a dietary supplement is considered a food.77 However, unlike for conventional
70108 Stat. 4325, s 2(15) (1994)
71See Peter B. Hutt, FDA Statutory Authority to Regulate the Safety of Dietary Supplements, 31 Am. J. L. and Med 155,
156-57 (2005)
7221 U.S.C. § 321(ﬀ)(1)(C)
7321 U.S.C. § 321(ﬀ)(1)(F)
7421 U.S.C. § 321(ﬀ)(3)(A)
7521 U.S.C. § 321(ﬀ)(3)(B)
7621 U.S.C. § 321(s)(6)
7721 U.S.C. § 321(ﬀ). In addition, dietary supplements are excluded from the deﬁnition of “food additive,” see 21. U.S.C. §
321(s)(6) and therefore not subject to pre-market approval requirements of food additives under 21 U.S.C. § 348.
14foods, the manufacturer of a dietary supplements containing a “new dietary ingredient” is required to notify
the FDA 75 days prior to marketing, and to include support for the safety of ingredient, unless the ingredient
is chemically unaltered and is used in the food supply as food.78 A “new dietary ingredient” is one that is
marketed prior to the passage of DSHEA (October 15, 1994).79
A dietary supplement, regardless of whether it contains old or new dietary ingredients, is prohibited if it
presents “a signiﬁcant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury under (i) conditions of use recommended or
suggested in labeling, or (ii) if no conditions of use are suggested or recommended in the labeling, under
ordinary conditions of use.”80 The burden of proof for demonstrating the lack of safety of a dietary supple-
ment is placed on the FDA.81 However, the Secretary of Health and Human Services has the power to ban
a dietary supplement by declaring it be an imminent health hazard.82 The declaration cannot be delegated,
and therefore cannot be made by the FDA Commissioner alone. Moreover, the declaration must be followed
by a administrative proceeding to aﬃrm or withdraw the ban.83 However, the FDA has the authority to
promulgate regulations for good manufacturing processes.84
Dietary supplements may make “structure or function” claims without being classiﬁed and regulated as
a drug.85 To make structure/function claims, the manufacturer must have substantiation that claims are
truthful and not misleading, notify the FDA within 30 days of making the claim, and include with the claim
the boilerplate disclaimer: “This statement has not been evaluated by the Food and Drug Administration.
This product is not intended to diagnose, treat, cure, or prevent any disease.”86
In addition to permitting structure / function claims on labels for dietary supplements, DSHEA narrowed
7821 U.S.C. § 350b(a)(2)
79See Hutt, supra note 71 at 160
8021 U.S.C. § 342(f)
8121 U.S.C. § 342(f); The FDA generally also bears the burden of proof on demonstrating the safety of foods. See Hutt,
supra note 71 at 161
8221 U.S.C. § 342(f)
83Id.
8421 U.S.C. § 342(g)
8521 U.S.C. § 321(g)
8621 U.S.C. § 343(s).
15the deﬁnition of “labeling.” Labeling is a critical component of the FDA’s regulatory powers, as labeling is
used to determine the intended use of an article, and thus the regulatory scheme that applies to the arti-
cle. Furthermore, the labeling is a key factor in determining whether an article is misbranded.87 Through
a determination that an article is misbranded the FDA has to power to seize the article88 and criminally
prosecute the manufacturers or distributors. 89
Under the FDCA, “labeling” is deﬁned as “written, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article or any
of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article.”90 Supreme Court adopted a broad inter-
pretation of “labeling” in Kordel v. United States91 and United States v. Ubuteit, 92 ﬁnding that leaﬂets,
pamphlets, and circulars could be part of the an article’s labeling even if shipped separately from the arti-
cle,93 and even if pamphlet is oﬀered for sale separately.94
DSHEA excludes accompanying publications from the deﬁnition of labeling, if certain conditions are met.
The publication cannot promote a speciﬁc manufacturer and must present a balanced view of available sci-
entiﬁc information.95 However, the FDA has the burden of proving that the accompanying publications are
not exempt from the deﬁnition of labeling.96 In summary, DSHEA eliminates the possibility of expansive
8721 U.S.C. § 321(n); see also 21 U.S.C. § 343 (misbranding of food, including dietary supplements), 21 U.S.C. § 352
(misbranding of drugs and medical devices)
8821 U.S.C. § 334
8921 U.S.C. § 333
9021 U.S.C. § 321(m)
91335 U.S. 345, 346-47 (1948)
92335 U.S. 355 (1948)
93In Kordel the Supreme Court considered whether circulars and pamphlets shipped separately from drugs were considered
to be part of the drug’s labeling, 335 U.S. at 346-47 and found “that the phrase ‘accompanying such article’ is not restricted to
labels that are on or in the article or package that is transported.” Id. at 349. In Ubuteit, the Court determined that leaﬂets
that explained the usefulness of a medical device for curing and treating various diseases, but that were shipped separately were
nevertheless part of the device’s labeling. 335 U.S. at 357. The Court held that the deﬁnition of labeling could be interpreted
by functional standards and found that leaﬂets were labeling as the purpose of the leaﬂet was integrated with the use of the
device. Id. at 358.
94See id.
9521 U.S.C. § 343-2. Speciﬁcally 1) is not false or misleading; (2) does not promote a particular manufacturer or brand of
a dietary supplement; (3) is displayed or presented, or is displayed or presented with other such items on the same subject
matter, so as to present a balanced view of the available scientiﬁc information on a dietary supplement; (4) if displayed in an
establishment, is physically separate from the dietary supplements; and (5) does not have appended to it any information by
sticker or any other method. Id.
96Id.
16FDA regulation of dietary supplements through the deﬁnition of labeling.97
Regulatory Blindspots for Herbal Remedies under DSHEA
DSHEA has been the target for criticism over its loosening of safety for herbal remedies. DSHEA deﬁned
dietary supplements broadly to not only include vitamins and minerals, but also the “concentrate, metabolite,
constituent, extract” of herbs and other botanicals.98 While DSHEA was passed in 1994, the FDA did not
propose regulations for good manufacturing processes until 2003; the proposed rules have yet to be ﬁnalized.99
As a result, the potency and purity of herbal remedies has been suspect. Large variations in the parts the
plants used, dosages, and chemical consistency were found between brands of many brands of the ten most
popular herbal remedies.100 Moreover, dangerously high concentrations of lead were found in tradition South
Indian Asian herbal remedies sold in Boston.101 Thus, consumers are exposed to both the risk of overdosing
due to an inability to accurately determine their intake of herbal compounds, and the risk of consuming
toxic substances that contaminate herbal remedies.
While issues of quality can perhaps be improved through the passage of regulations of good manufacturing
practices, other concerns of safety can only be addressed by amending DSHEA. Medical journals have
reported serious side eﬀects, from the use of herbal remedies, side eﬀects including liver damage, kidney
failure, and death.102 Kava, an herb used for psychotherapy for anxiety, was removed from the market
97See United States v. 250 Jars... “Cal’s Tupelo Blossom U.S. Fancy Pure Honey,” 344 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1965) (booklet
shown to FDA inspector posing as prospective customer was labeling); United States v. 8 Cartons, “Plantation The Original’...
Molasses,” 103 F. Supp. 626 (W.D.N.Y. 1951) (books that were displayed and distributed with article were part of the labeling
of the article). See also Mark E. Boulding, The Statutory Basis for FDA Regulation of Scientiﬁc and Educational Information,
4 J. Pharmacy & Law 123, 130 (1995) (noting that the FDA has adopted the position that “bona ﬁde scientiﬁc and educational
materials could be labeling”)
9821 U.S.C. § 321(ﬀ)
99Proposed Rule, Current Good Manufacturing Practice in Manufacturing, Packing, or Holding Dietary Ingredients and
Dietary Supplements, 68 Fed. Reg. 12157 (March 13, 2003).
100Judith Garrand, Variations in Product Choices of Frequently Purchased Herbs, 2003 Arch. Int. Med. 2290, 2290-2295
(2003)
101Robert B. Saper, et. al., Heavy Metal Content of Ayurvedic Herbal Medicine Products, 292 JAMA 2868, 2868-72 (2004)
102See Edzard Ernst, Harmless Herbs? A Review of the Recent Literature, 104 Am. J. Med. 170, 17074 (1998)
17in Germany after liver toxicity.103 The pharmacological potency of herbal remedies is also evident in the
documented interactions between many popular herbals remedies and traditional drugs.104 Critics of DSHEA
assert that by not providing for clinical testing, DSHEA unleashed herbal remedies into the public without
providing an adequate understanding of the potential interactions of drugs and herbal medicines.105 By
not requiring pre-market approval for herbal remedies, DSHEA made an implicit assumption that herbal
remedies are safe. Given the pharmacology of herbal remedies, this implicit is suspect, if not contrary to the
scientiﬁc evidence.
Lastly, while proponents of traditional herbal medicines suggest that the safety of herbal remedies has been
demonstrated through thousands of years of human experience and trial and error,106 DSHEA makes no
provisions for whether the herbal remedy is a traditional preparation, and fails to consider the length and
quality of prior human experience as a factor in inclusion as a dietary supplement. Even extracts and
concentrations of botanicals that far exceed what was safely used in traditional herbal remedies and extracts
from herbs with little prior use fall under the DSHEA’s dietary supplement deﬁnition.
Vioxx and Ephedra – Twin Safety Debacles of Lifestyle Drugs and Herbal Remedies
For both lifestyle drugs and herbal remedies, the regulatory blindspots came into full public view with the
103See Johannes Schulze et. al., Toxicity of Kava a Case Study, 10 Phytomedicine, Supplement IV 68, 68-73 (2003)
104See Adriane Fugh-Berman, Herb-Drug Interactions, 355 Lancet 134, 134-36 (2000)
105See Frederick W. Fraunfelder, The Science and Marketing of Dietary Supplements, 140 Am. J. Ophthal. 302, 303 (2005)
106See e.g., Lei, supra note 9 at 124-128 (arguing that prevalence of traditional Chinese medicines in Asian countries is proof
of its beneﬁts); Huft, supra note 12 at 1696-1700
18recall of a widely used and popular product. In the case of lifestyles drugs, the recall was of Vioxx by
its manufacturer, Merck; for herbal remedies, recall was the FDA’s ban of ephedra. And both instances,
administrators from the FDA was called to testify in Congressional hearings to explain the eﬀorts of FDA
to prevent repeat occurrences.
Vioxx
On September 30, 1994, Merck announced that it was voluntarily withdrawing Vioxx (also known as rofe-
coxib), 107 a drug approved by the FDA in 1999 for the treatment of arthritis and acute pain.108 Vioxx
is a COX-2 inhibitor and part of family of nonsteroidal anti-inﬂammatory drugs (NSAIDs).109 Traditional
NSAIDs inhibited both the COX-1 and the COX-2 enzymes, and could cause gastrointestinal bleeding; the
numerous deaths and even more hospitalizations were attributable to the side eﬀects.110 By selectively in-
hibiting of only the COX-2 enzyme, Vioxx could provide the anti-inﬂammatory and pain relief beneﬁts of
traditional NSAIDs, without the gastrointestinal complications.111
COX-2 inhibitors arrived on the market near the turn of the millennium; other COX-2 inhibitors, Celebrex
and Betrax, both manufactured by Pﬁzer, gained FDA approval in 1998 and 2001, respectively. The use of
COX-2 inhibitors quickly spread. In 1999, an estimated 18% of patients who had visited a doctor reported
using a COX-2 inhibitor. 112 By 2002, 29% of patients reported using COX-2s.113 COX-2 inhibitors were
no more eﬀective at treating pain and inﬂammation than traditional NSAIDs but cost signiﬁcantly more.
107See Press Release, Merck & Co., Merck Announces Voluntary Worldwide Withdrawal of VIOXX r  (Sept. 30, 2004) available
at http://www.vioxx.com/vioxx/documents/english/vioxx press release.pdf
108See id.
109See id.
110See Claire Bombardier et. al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with
Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 N. Eng. J. Med. 1520, 1520-21 (2000)
111See id.
112See Carolanne Dai et. al., National Trends in Cyclooxygenase-2 Inhibitor Use Since Market Release, 165 Arch. Intern.
Med. 171, 173 (2005)
113See id.
19Despite the cost diﬀerentials, COX-2 inhibitors were being used more and more frequently in those least at
risk for gastrointestinal complications, i.e. for those who gained the least beneﬁt from COX-2s. In 1999,
35% of the patients using NSAIDs were using COX-2; by 2000, COX-2 accounted for 61% of NSAID use.114
Merck withdrew Vioxx after a large scale study suggested that Vioxx increased the risk of heart attacks.115
Vioxx had been a blockbuster for Merck. In 2003, it accounted for $2.5 billion, or more than 10% of its $22.5
billion in sales.116 At the time of its withdrawal, Vioxx was used by an estimated 80 million Americans.
117 But the extensive use of Vioxx also meant extensive liability for Merck – Vioxx was estimated to be
responsible for over 27,000 heart attacks and deaths.118 After the withdraw of Vioxx, Merck faced numerous
lawsuits, 9,650 according to Merck’s 2005 annual report. And perhaps as a bad omen for Merck, in the
ﬁrst lawsuit to reach verdict, the jury found Merck liable for $253 million in compensatory and punitive
damages.119
The Vioxx withdrawal spawned two Congressional Hearings, the ﬁrst on November 14, 2004 in the Senate
(entitled “FDA, Merck and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First?”)120 and the a second on May 5, 2005,
in the House (entitled, “Risk and Responsibility: The Roles of the FDA and Pharmaceutical Companies in
Ensuring the Safety of Approved Drugs, Like Vioxx.”)121 At the Senate hearing, the Deputy Director of
114See id. at 174
115See Press Release, Merck supra note 107
116Merck Annual Report 2003, 10-K 2, 19 (ﬁled March 10. 2004), available at http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=73184&p=irol-irhome
117See Peter J¨ uni et. al., Risk of Cardiovascular Events and Rofecoxib: Cumulative Meta-Analysis, 364 Lancet 2021, 2021
(2004)
118See Richard Horton, Vioxx, the implosion of Merck, and aftershocks at the FDA, 364 Lancet 1995, 1995 (2004)
119See Merck Annual Report 2005, 10-K 26, (ﬁled Mar. 13, 2005), available at http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=73184&p=irol-irhome
120FDA, Merck and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First?, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 108th Cong. (2004)
available at http://www.senate.gov/∼ﬁnance/sitepages/hearing111804.htm
121Risk and Responsibility: The Roles of the FDA and Pharmaceutical Companies in Ensuring the Safety of Approved Drugs,
20the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), FDA submitted a written statement that declared
that FDA planned to publish guidances to “assist pharmaceutical ﬁrms in identifying and assessing potential
safety risks not only before a drug reaches the market and but also after a drug is already on the market.”122
Likewise, at the House hearings, the Acting Director for CDER, FDA, testiﬁed to the FDA’s increase in
resources at the Oﬃce of Drug Safety, the division responsible for postmarketing surveillance.123
In the aftermath of Vioxx, the FDA ultimately requested that Betrax be withdrawn; however, Celebrex still
remains on the market.124
Ephedra
The safety of ephedra, and of dietary supplements in reached the public spotlight with the death of Steve
Bechler in 2003, a 23-years old pitcher for the Baltimore Orioles. Bechler had oﬃcially died of heatstroke
during spring training, but the coroner found that ephedra likely contributed to his death.125 Ephedra is
derived from ma huang, an herb used in traditional Chinese medicine for colds and asthma. In the United
States, ephedra was marketed for from weight loss to increased energy.126
The FDA had raised concerns ephedra in 1997, when it proposed to classify dietary supplements containing
ephedra as adulterated if the supplement 1) contained more than eight milligrams of ephedra per serving,
2) suggested a usage of more than eight milligrams per six-hour period or twenty-four milligrams in a day,
Like Vioxx, Hearing Before the H. Comm. Gov’t. Reform 109th Cong. (2005) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.128&ﬁlename=21483.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/109 house hearings
122Statement of Sandra Kweder, Deputy Director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA, FDA, Merck and
Vioxx supra note 120, 6 available at, http://www.senate.gov/∼ﬁnance/hearings/testimony/2004test/111804sktest.pdf
123Statement of Steven Galson, Acting Director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA, Risk and Responsibility
supra note 120 at 37-38.
124See http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/cox2/default.htm
125See Reilley M. Dunne, How Much Regulation Can We Swallow? The Ban on Ephedra and How it may Aﬀect Your Access
to Dietary Supplements, 31 J. Legis. 351, 351 (2005)
126See id. at 358
21or 3) contained as caﬀeine, or other stimulant.127 In addition, the proposed rule would have required the
label to warn against exceeding the recommended dosage and against use for longer than one week.128 The
rules had been proposed after the FDA received more than 800 adverse event reaction reports concerning
products containing ephedra, with reactions ranging from increased blood pressure and insomnia to heart
attack and stroke.129
FDA eﬀorts were stymied after the Government Accounting Oﬃce (GAO) examined the FDA’s proposed rules
and concluded that additional research should be conducted.130 In particular, the GAO report found that
the FDA had relied solely on adverse event reports (AERs) as the basis of its proposed regulation, but that
the AERs were often incomplete and inconsistent. In addition, the FDA lack procedures to systematically
determine the classiﬁcation the AERs, and to incorporate the AERs into its decision making.131 The report
concluded that the FDA “needs to provide stronger evidence on the relationship between the intake of
dietary supplements containing ephedrine alkaloids and the occurrence of adverse reactions that support the
proposed dosing levels and duration of use limits.”132 In response to the GAO report, the FDA modiﬁed its
proposed regulations, dropping all limitations of dosage but retaining its proposal to ban products containing
a combination of epherda and another stimulant, such as caﬀeine.133
After additional reports of the dangers of ephedra, a hearing on the Senate Committee on Governmental
Aﬀairs was convened on October 2002 (entitled, “Ephedra: Who is Protecting the American Consumer.”)134
127Proposed Rule, Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine Alkaloids, 62 Fed. Reg. 30,678 (June 4, 1997)
128See id.
129See id. at 30679
130Uncertainties in Analyses Underlying FDA’s Proposed Rule on Ephedrine Alkaloids, GAO/HEHS/GGD-99-90 (1999)
131See id. at 8-13
132Id. at 25.
133Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine Alkaloids; Withdrawal in Part, 65 Fed. Reg. 17474 (April 3, 2000) available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/h299090.pdf
134Ephedra: Who is Protecting the American Consumers?, Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. Oversight of Gov’t
Mgmt, Restructuring, & Dist. of Columbia., Comm. On Gov’t. Aﬀairs, 107th Cong. (200), available at
22At the hearing, the parents of a sixteen year-old high school basketball player, who had died after using
supplements containing ephedra, were called to provide a personal narrative on the dangers of ephedra.135
The American Medical Association voiced support for banning ephedra.136 The FDA’s acting commissioner
testiﬁed to the diﬃculty of banning ephedra under DSHEA. 137 The FDA could remove ephedra by demon-
strating that it was unsafe, but the necessary tests had not yet been completed, despite concerns of safety
more than ﬁve years. Moreover, the commissioner noted that declaring a substance to be an “imminent
hazard” was “a long, torturous process...[that] has not been attempted since the middle-1980s, when it
failed for the fourth time, with another drug category – prior to [DHSEA].”138
The Senate hearings were followed by hearings in the House in July, 2003 (entitled “Issues Relating To
Ephedra-Containing Dietary Supplements”), during which executives from Metabolife, a manufacturer of
ephedra containing supplements were subpoenaed.139 The executives declined to answer, invoking their
right against selfincrimination.140 Representatives for NVE Pharmaceuticals and Cytodyne Technologies,
also manufacturers of dietary supplements containing ephedra, asserted that their products were safe when
used as directed.141 The FDA Commissioner also testiﬁed, and noted that post-marketing regulations based
on AERs were the primary regulatory tool for dietary supplements such as ephedra, and that the FDA was
still in the process of studying the AERs it had received.142
In 2004, more than six years from its initial proposal to restrict ephedra, the FDA was ﬁnally able to ban
ephedra. In March 2003 the FDA reopened comments for the 1997 proposed rule,143 citing a report by the
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107 senate hearings&docid=f:83482.pdf
135See id. at 4-7
136Id. at 21-22
137Id. at 39
138Id. at 45
139Issues Relating To Ephedra-Containing Dietary Supplements, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, Subcomm. Com-
merce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, H. Comm. Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong., (2003) 9.
140Id. at 92-96
141Id. at 120 (statement from NVE Pharm.) and 108 (statement from Cytodyne Tech.)
142Id. at 233-34. 238-39
143Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine Alkaloids; Reopening of the Comment Period, 68 Fed. Reg. 10417, 10417,
10417-19 (March 5, 2003)
23RAND Corporation.144 The RAND report analyzed the results of clinical trials published in the medical
literature, as well as AERs provided by the FDA and an ephedra manufacturer (Metabolife).145 The report
analyzed AERs and concluded that epherdra was associated with serious events, which included stoke, heart
attack, and death. However, the reported also noted that: “Scientiﬁc studies (not additional case reports)
are necessary in order to assess the possible association between consumption of ephedra-containing dietary
supplements and these serious adverse events.”146 The FDA issued the ﬁnal rule banning epherdra on Febru-
ary 11, 2004, declaring that ephedra presented an unreasonable risk of injury, and was thus adulterated under
21 U.S.C. 342(f)(1)(A).147
However, the FDA’s regulations banning all epherdra supplements was successfully challenged in Nutraceu-
tical Corp. v. Crawford.148 In Nutraceutical, the court found that the FDA’s use of risk-beneﬁt analysis
was impressible as such analysis would shift the burden to the manufacturers of dietary supplements, in
contravention of DSHEA.149 Moreover, its ban of ephedra dietary supplements containing less than ten
milligrams of ephedra was impermissible as DSHEA requires dose-speciﬁc analysis.150 To ban all ephedra
dietary supplements, the FDA must “prove that any dose amount, no matter how small, presents a signiﬁ-
cant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury.”151 While Nutraceutical is district court case and therefore has
limited precendental value, it nevertheless calls suggests the potentially strict limits of the FDA’s powers to
regulate dietary supplements.
144See RAND Corporation, Ephedra and Ephedrine for Weight Loss and Athletic Performance Enhancement: Clinical Eﬃcacy
and Side Eﬀects, AHRQ Publication No. 03-E022 (2003) available at http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/95n-0304-
bkg0003-ref-07-01-index.htm
145See id. at 15-17, 26-30
146See id. at 203
147See Final Rule Declaring Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine Alkaloids Adulterated Because They Present an
Unreasonable Risk, 69 Fed. Reg. 6788 (Feb. 11, 2004)
148364 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (D. Utah 2005)
149See id. at 1317-19
150See id. at 1320
151See id.
24Regulatory Responses to Vioxx and Ephedra: Post-Market Enforcement
In the wake of Vioxx and Ephedra, reforms were proposed, calling for increased post-marketing surveillance
and increased FDA enforcement powers to remove unsafe products from the market. The proposals were
made separately for drugs and dietary supplements and were based on diﬀerent rationales.
Several proposals suggested that the current regulation of drugs had too much inertia. The high barriers
to pre-market approval kept too many beneﬁcial drugs from the market, and at the same time, and lack of
FDA action postmarketing kept too many harmful drugs on the market.152 The current regulatory scheme
is lacking in its ability to identify adverse eﬀects. The population included in pre-market clinical trials are
often the same ones who ultimately use the drug post-marketing.153 Moreover, larger populations and longer
time spans are necessary to detect many of adverse eﬀects of drugs, especially lifestyle drugs with chronic
and frequent usage.154 The regulation of drugs should lower the hurdles for pre-market approval, so that
fewer and smaller scale clinical trials are utilized.155 In essence, the current drug approval system should
shift focus away from pre-marketing approval and towards post-marketing removal.
In the wake of Ephedra, reforms to DSHEA also called for greater post-marketing enforcement.156 Under
DSHEA, post-marketing surveillance has been limited primarily through on self-reporting by consumers
152See e.g. Richard A. Epstein, Symposium - Pharmaceutical Innovation and Cost: An American Dilemma: Regulatory
Paternalism in the Market for Drugs: Lessons from Vioxx and Celebrex, 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 741, 747-
50 (2005); Anup Malani & Feifang Hu, The Option Value of New Therapeutics (MacClean Center Conference, University of
Chicago, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=617382; Brian L. Strom, How the U.S.
Drug Safety System Should be Change, 295 JAMA 2072, 2073-74 (2006);
153See Epstein, supra note 152 at 750-55; Malani & Hu, supra note 152 at 3-6; Strom, supra note 152 at 2073
154See Epstein, supra note 152 at 756-57; Strom, supra note 152 at 2073
155See Epstein, supra note 152 at 750-55; Malani & Hu, supra note 152 at 14-15, Strom, supra note 152 at 2073-74
156See e.g., Debra D. Burke & Anderson P. Page, Regulating the Dietary Supplements Industry, Something Still Needs to
Change, 1 Hastings Bus. L.J. 121, 148-50 (2005); Donald M. Marcus & Arthur P. Grollman, Botanical Medicines – the Need
for New Regulations, 374 N.E. J. Med. 2073-74 (2002)
25and physicians.157 Manufacturers did not also readily produce reports when requested by the FDA. In the
case of epherda, Metabolife, a manufacturer of ephedra supplements, and its chief executive were indicted for
falsifying records provided to the FDA.158 Several bills were introduced in Congress that would have amended
DSHEA to enhance post-marketing surveillance eﬀorts. The Dietary Supplement Information Act would
require manufacturers of dietary supplements to register with the FDA,159 and post-marketing reporting
of adverse events.160 Likewise, the Dietary Supplement Safety Act, would require manufacturers to report
adverse event161 and permits the FDA to establish a plan of mandatory surveillance.162 However, others
have suggested that DSHEA already provides the FDA with adequate enforcement remedies. Even DSHEA’s
defenders, however, seen agree that increased postsurveillance monitoring is needed; the disagreement is over
whether DSHEA or the FDA was the problem. For the defenders, the solution is not to amend DSHEA, but
to provide the FDA with the resources necessary for proper enforcement.163
The suggestions for post-marketing enforcement were not the only reform proposals in the wake of Vioxx
and Ephedra. In addition to proposing to increase the resources for post-marketing surveillance in the
wake of Vioxx, the FDA also proposed to re-examine the pre-market approval process.164 And in the wake
of Ephedra, some proposed the repeal of DSHEA.165 The merits of enhanced post-marketing regulation,
are apparent when the changes in the market for lifestyle drugs and herbal remedies. In particular, for
lifestyle drugs, pre-market approval is reaching its limits of feasibility, and post-marketing regulations will
157Dietary Supplement Safety Act: How is FDA Doing 10 Years Later? Hearing Before Comm. on S. Gov’t
Aﬀairs, Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Robert Brackett, Ph.D.,
Director for Ctr. for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition of the U.S. Food and Drug Admin.), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Testimony&HearingID=179&WitnessID =647&IsTextOnly=0 (last
visited Mar. 15, 2005).
158See Department of Justice News Release Summary, http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/doj72204.html
159108 HR 724, s 416(a)
160Id. at s 416(b)
161S. 722, 108th Cong. (2003), 416 (b)
162Id. s 416 (c)
163See Reilley M. Dunne, How Much Regulation Can We Swallow? The Ban on Ephedra and How it may Aﬀect Your Access
to Dietary Supplements, 31 J. Legis. 351, 377 (2005); see also
164See Statement of Sandra Kweder, supra note 122 at 6
165See e.g., Peter J. Cohen, Science, Politics, and the Regulation of Dietary Supplements: It’s Time to Repeal DSHEA, 31
Am. J. L. Med. 175 (2005)
26be increasingly necessary. And the converging conceptions of lifestyle drugs and herbal medicines, suggest
that post-marketing regulation of herbal remedies is also the optimal regime.
Converging Conceptions for Lifestyle Drugs and Herbal Remedies
Direct to Consumer Advertising and the Market for Lifestyle Drugs
While several factors undoubtedly contribute to the booming market of lifestyle drugs, including the aging
of the baby boomer population, the contribution proliferation of DTCA advertising is likely to be signiﬁcant.
The regulation of advertising of prescription drugs is explicitly provided for under the FDCA, which requires
that prescription drug advertising must contain a “brief summary relating to side eﬀects, contraindications,
and eﬀectiveness”166 For broadcast advertisements of prescription drugs, the FDA regulations require that
the manufacturer disclose the major risks and side-eﬀects of the drug and make an “adequate provision”
for disseminating the labeling information to the audience.167 Prior to 1997, the broadcast advertising
had been limited as it could not meet the “adequate provision” requirement.168 Advertising was limited to
“reminders,” which could contain the name of the drug but could not suggestions for use, and “help-seeking”
which provided information on a disease or condition, but could not mention the drug. Both were permitted
as they were exempted from the “adequate provision” requirement.169
16621 U.S.C. § 352(n)
16721 C.F.R. 202.1(e)(1)
168Direct-to-Consumer Promotion; Public Hearing, 60 Fed. Reg. 42581, 42582-83 (Aug. 16, 1995)
169See id.
27In 1997, the FDA changed its regulation of DTCA by publishing a draft of the Guidance for Industry:
Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertising.170 The guidance was ﬁnalized in 1999.171 The guidance pro-
vided that the “adequate provision” requirement for broadcast advertising could be met if the broadcast
contained a referrals to a physician, a toll-free number and website, and references to print advertising that
contained more information.172 As a result of the change in the FDA’s regulatory stance, prescription drug
advertisements have exploded. According to the General Accounting Oﬃce (GAO), in 1997, pharmaceutical
companies spent $1.1 billion on DTCA. In 2001, the amount of spending had more than doubled, to $2.7
billion.173 Moreover, the majority of the growth in spending was in television, which accounted for 25% of
expenditures in 1997, but accounted for 64% in 2001.174
The large majority of direct to consumer spending has, predictably been in small number of drugs for chronic
conditions – i.e. drugs that can be classiﬁed as lifestyle drugs. The top ﬁfteen most heavily advertised drugs
accounted for just over half (54%) of the total DTCA. On these, 6 of the drugs were for allergy or asthma,
3 for high cholesterol, 2 for arthritis, and 1 each for acid reﬂux, depression, obesity, and impotence.175 The
focus of broadcast advertising in lifestyle drugs is perhaps not surprising as lifestyle drugs are particularly
suited for the broadcast medium. Lifestyle drugs are targeted a large general population base and the broad-
cast advertising medium is designed to reach this large, general audience. Moreover, the conditions targeted
by such drugs are those that the public generally understands and is able to self-diagnose.176
170Notice of Availability, Draft Guidance for Industry; Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements, 62 Fed. Reg. 43171
(Aug. 12,1997)
171Notice of Availability, Guidance For Industry on Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements, 64 Fed. Reg. 43197 (Aug.
9, 1999);
172See Guidance For Industry on Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements (1999)
173See Government Accounting Oﬃce, Prescription Drugs, FDA Oversight of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising Has Limitations
GAO-03-177 10 (2002)
174See id.
175See id. at 12; see also Michael S. Wilkes et. al., Direct-To-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising: Trends, Impact, And
Implications, 19 Health Affairs 110, 110-127 (2000) (describing trends in DTCA)
176Devora Mitrany, Lifestyle Drugs Determining Their Value and Who Should Pay, 19 Pharmacoeconomics 441, 445 (2001)
28The overall wisdom of permitting DTCA has been contentious. Proponents argue that such advertising
provide a value channel of education for consumers and improves awareness of health conditions, while oppo-
nents suggest that it undermines the patientphysician relationship and spurs unnecessary use of prescription
drugs.177 Moreover, First Amendment free speech principles are implicated.178 However, DTCA has un-
doubtedly had an eﬀect on both patient and physician behavior. An FDA survey concluded that awareness
of drugs and health conditions among patients has been increased by DTCA, prompting patients to seek
information on the drugs or health conditions.179 The FDA’s survey focused on patient and physician atti-
tudes and behaviors, rather than on the speciﬁc types of prescriptions requested. The potential for DTCA
to diﬀerentially impact the prescription of lifestyle drugs was suggested in another study that compared pa-
tient’s requests for prescription in the United States (where DTCA is permitted) and Canada (where DTCA
is not permitted). The study concluded that DTCA results in patients requesting speciﬁc prescriptions from
doctors more often, and that many of the requested prescriptions were for lifestyle drugs.180
The potential impact of DTCA on spurring demand for prescription drugs is perhaps no where better high-
lighted than by Merck and its advertising of the now recalled Vioxx. In 2000, Vioxx was the most heavily
advertised drug, with Merck spending $160.8 million.181 The amount spent by Merck exceeded the adver-
tising budgets of popular consumer brands such as Pepsi or Budweiser.182 Sales of Vioxx quadrupled in less
than a year, from $329.5 million in 1999 to $1.5 billion in 2000.
177See e.g., Elizabeth A. Almasi et. al., What Are the Public Health Eﬀects of Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertising?, 3
PLoS Medicine 284, 284-286 (2006) (summarizing viewpoints of DTCA); Alan F. Homer, Direct-to-Consumer Prescription
Drug Advertising Builds Bridges Between Patients and Physicians, 289 JAMA 380, 380-82 (1999); Matthew F. Hollon, Direct-
to-Consumer Marketing of Prescription Drugs: Creating Consumer Demand, 289 JAMA 382, 382-84 (1999).
178See e.g., George W. Evans & Anold I. Freide, The Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation of Prescription Drug
Manufacturer Speech: A First Amendment Analysis, 58 Food Drug L. J. 364 (2003)
179See Kathryn J. Aikin et. al, Patient and Physician Attitudes and Behaviors Associated With DTC Promotion of Prescription
Drugs, 1-4 (2004) available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ddmac/Final%20Report/FRﬁnal111904.pdf
180See Barbra Mintze, How Does Direct-to-Consumer Advertising (DTCA) Aﬀect Prescribing? A Survey in Primary Care
Environments With and Without Legal DTCA, 16 Canadian Med. Assn. J. 405, 411-12 (2003)
181See The National Institute for Health Care Management Research and Educational Foundation, Prescription Drugs and
Mass Media Advertising, 2000 2 (2001) available at http://www.nihcm.org/DTCbrief2001.pdf
182See id. at 5
29Eﬀects of DTCA on the market for herbal remedies
DTCA has potentially stimulated demand for lifestyle drugs, by medicalizaing normal health conditions.183
With widespread use and questionable necessity of lifestyle drugs, health insurance companies have balked
at coverage for them.184 Those whose health care plans do not cover their desired drugs, or who do not have
health insurance coverage have diﬃculty satisfying those demands. For many of these people, herbal remedies
may be viewed as cheaper alternatives to prescription drugs. Compared to those that have insurance, the
uninsured are more likely to use dietary supplements.185 Moreover, herbal remedies are used for conditions
such as, arthritis and allergies, conditions that closely match those targeted by lifestyle drugs.186 More than
half of the respondents in one survey believed that dietary supplements is useful in treating diseases such
(61% surveyed), arthritis (53%), depression (52%), and inﬂuenza (49%).187 Moreover, beliefs that herbal
remedies can be as potent as drugs are perhaps not unfounded.
The active ingredients in herbal remedies may also be similar or identical to those in prescription drugs.
The seeming arbitrariness of the distinction between drugs and dietary supplements was further highlighted
in Pharmanex v. Shalala.188 In Pharmanex, the FDA challenged the classiﬁcation of a product named
Cholestin as a dietary supplement, contending that the product fell under the deﬁnition of “new drug.”189
Cholestin was made from red yeast and contains, lovastatin, the chemical compound found in Mevacor, a
prescription drug used to treat high cholesterol and heart disease.190 The FDA had asserted that Chlolestin
183See e.g., Charles Medawar et. al, Direct to Consumer Advertising is Medicalising Normal Human Experience, 324 Brit.
Med. J. 908, 908-09 (2002)
184See e.g., Mitrany, supra note 176 at 441-48
185See Robert J. Blendon et. al, Americans’ Views on the Use and Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 161 Arch. Internal.
Med. 805, 806 (2001)
186See Eisenberg, supra note 14
187See id.
188221 F.3d 1151, 1153 (10th Cir. 2000)
189See id. at 1155-56
190See Pharmanex, Inc. v. Shalala, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1344 (D. Utah 1999)
30failed to meet the deﬁnition of “dietary supplement” under the FDCA. Under DSHEA, a product is excluded
from the deﬁnition of “dietary supplement” if it contains “an article that is approved as a new drug...which
was not before such approval, certiﬁcation, licensing, or authorization marketed as a dietary supplement
or as a food.”191 Because Mevacor was approved in 1987, prior to the marketing of Chlolestin, the FDA
considered Cholestin to contain an “article” that was previously approved as a new drug.192 The issue was
one of statutory interpretation – whether “article” under DSHEA referred only to ﬁnished drug products
or also to individual constituents.193 After losing in district court,194 the FDA prevailed on appeal, with
the Tenth Circuit upholding the FDA’s statutory interpretation on the basis of deference administrative
agencies.195 Thus, simple timing diﬀerentiates drugs from dietary supplements, driving deep diﬀerences not
only in regulations, but also in costs.
While the FDA may have been victorious in the short-term in Pharamanex, the longer-term implications
are less certain. While Pharamanex could be interpreted not only as an attempt by the FDA stringently
regulate herbal remedies, it could also be perceived as an attempt by the FDA to protect the pharmaceutical
industry. Under the Drug User Fee Act, approval for a new drug applications are funded through user fees
paid the drug’s manufacturer.196 The user fees leaves the drug approval process open to the criticism that
the FDA has become beholden to those the very pharmaceutical companies that should be regulating.197
Because dietary supplement manufacturers do not fund the FDA as they do not pay user fees, the FDA could
be seen as favoring large pharmaceutical companies to the detriment of consumers and dietary supplement
19121 U.S.C. § 321(ﬀ)(3)
192See 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1344
193211 F.3d at 1153
19435 F. Supp. 2d at 1359
195211 F.3d at 1160
196Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (1992)
197See Vioxx Fears Prompt Call for User Fee Evaluation, 4 Nature Rev. Drug. Discovery 179, 179 (2005); Alexan-
dra Marks, How Drug-Approval Woes Crept Up on FDA, The Christian Science Monitor (Nov. 26, 2004) available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1126/p02s01-uspo.html
31manufacturers.
This criticism of conﬂict of interests came to forefront with the Vioxx withdrawal.198 As the FDA had
approved Vioxx, the publicity over the safety of Vioxx predictably and invariably prompted scrutiny into
the conduct of the FDA. At the Senate hearings199 David Graham, associate science director of the Oﬃce
of Drug Safety at the FDA, prepared a statement in which he declared: “I was pressured to change my
conclusions and recommendations, and basically threatened that if I did not change them, I would not be
permitted to present the paper at the conference.”200 Graham described the culture in drug approval process
as one “views the pharmaceutical industry it is supposed to regulate as its client, over-values the beneﬁts of
the drugs it approves and seriously under-values, disregards and disrespects drug safety.”201 The comments
were carried and ampliﬁed by both the Washington Post, which wrote that Graham had allegedly been
pressured by his superiors to suppress the results of his study that demonstrated Vioxx increased the risk of
heart attacks,202 and the New York Times, which suggested that the FDA attempted to delay Graham’s on
the safety of Vioxx.203
The publicity of 2003 internal survey204 from Department of Health and Human Services only served to
bolster concerns about FDA’s oversight into the drug approval process. The conclusions of the survey were
seemingly positive, noting “reviewers face workload pressures that increasingly challenge the eﬀectiveness of
the process” but that “[t]he enactment of PDUFA III [Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness
Act of 2002, authorizing continued use of user fees] presents signiﬁcant opportunities to address many of
198See id.; Vioxx Fears Prompt Call for User Fee Evaluation supra note 197
199Statement of David Graham, FDA, Merck and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First?, ,supra note 120 available at
http://www.senate.gov/∼ﬁnance/hearings/testimony/2004test/111804dgtest.pdf
200Id. at 3
201Id.
202See Marc Kaufman, “FDA Oﬃcial Alleges Pressure to Suppress Vioxx Findings” The Washington Post A23, Oct. 8,
2004
203See Gardiner Harris, Drug-Safety Reviewer Says F.D.A. Delayed Vioxx Study, N.Y. Times, A1, Nov. 4, 2004
204FDA’s Review Process for New Drug Applications A Management Review (2003), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-01-00590.pdf
32the ﬁndings in this report.”205 In the wake of the Vioxx withdrawal, the contents of the survey were more
closely examined. Two public interest groups, Union of Concerned Scientists and Public Employees for
Environmental Responsibility ﬁled Freedom of Information requests to obtain public release of the survey
results.206 The Washington Post, a month and a half months after the Vioxx withdrawal, noted that the
survey hinted at concerns by FDA scientists over the drug approval process. The paper noted that, according
to the survey, 36% “of scientists said they were only somewhat conﬁdent, or not conﬁdent at all, in the FDA’s
decisions regarding drug safety,”207 and that 18% of FDA scientists had felt pressured to approve a new drug,
“despite reservations about the safety, eﬃcacy, or quality of the drug.”208
Perceptions that the FDA was too closely tied to the pharmaceutical companies that they were supposed to
be regulating could only have been exacerbated by the recommendation of a FDA advisory panel to permit
COX-2 inhibitors, Celebrex, Betrax, and Vioxx, to remain on the market, even after Merck’s voluntary
withdrawal of Vioxx. The panel recommended the COX-2 inhibitors have additional warning labels and
limitations on advertising.209 However, the objectively of the advisory panel was questioned by the New
York Times, which found that ten of the thirty-two advisors had ties to the makers of the COX-2 inhibitors.210
These ten votes voted nine to one for the continued marketing of Betrax and Vioxx, and the exclusion of
these votes would have altered the outcome for these two drugs.211
One survey suggested that the public conﬁdence in the FDA’s ability to regulate the safety of drugs decreased
as a result of the Vioxx withdrawal.212 To the extent that Vioxx has also reinforced perceptions of the
conﬂicts of interest in the FDA, many consumers may discount the lack of FDA approval for claims of herbal
205Id. at iv.
206See Marc Kaufman, “Many FDA Scientists Had Drug Concerns, 2002 Survey Shows” A01, The Washington Post, Dec.
16, 2004.
207Id.
208Id.
209See Gardiner Harris, “F.D.A. is Advised to Let Pain Pills Stay on the Market” N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 2005
210See Gardiner Harris and Alex Berenson, “10 Voters on Panel Backing Pain Had Industry Ties” N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 2005
211See id. The recommendation for Celebrex would not been altered by the exclusion of the ten votes. See id.
212See Ipsos Ideas Press Release, Vioxx Recall Hurt American’s Conﬁdence in FDA, Not Prescription Drugs (Mar. 9, 2005)
available at http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/client/act dsp pdf.cfm?name=mr050309-2.pdf&id=2591
33remedies, and view herbal remedies as means to acquiring the beneﬁts of lifestyle drugs –
beneﬁts that through DTCA, they have come to be believed to possible through a “magic pill” – but without
the costs.
Lack of Distinction Between Structure / Function and Disease Claims Further Drive
Market Convergence of Lifestyle Drugs and Herbal Remedies
Attempts to diﬀerentiate drugs from dietary supplements ironically have further steered herbal remedies
towards same market as lifestyle drugs. Since claims establish intended use and intended use determines
whether the product will be regulated as a drug, one of the primary beneﬁts that a manufacturer gains from
subjecting its product to drug regulation is in the claims that it can make. Drugs may make claims for the
cure, treatment, mitigation, or prevention of disease. Dietary supplements are explicitly prohibited from
such disease claims, but are permitted to make structure / claims.
Under FDA regulations promulgated in 2000,213 for the purposes of dietary supplement labeling, “disease”
is deﬁned as “damage to an organ, part, structure, or system of the body such that it does not function
properly (e.g., cardiovascular disease), or a state of health leading to such dysfunctioning (e.g., hypertension);
except that diseases resulting from essential nutrient deﬁciencies (e.g., scurvy, pellagra) are not included in
this deﬁnition.”214 Claims relating to an eﬀect on a speciﬁc disease,215 characteristics of a disease, 216 or an
21321 C.F.R. 101.93(g)(2); see also Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the Eﬀect of the
Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, 65 Fed. Reg. 1000 (Jan. 6, 2000) (codifying parts of 21 C.F.R. 101)
(hereinafter, “Reg. of Struct. / Func.”)
21421 C.F.R. 101.93(g)(1)
21521 C.F.R. 101.93(g)(2)(i)
21621 C.F.R. 101.93(g)(2)(ii)
34abnormal condition associated with a disease217 will be considered to be disease claims. Moreover, additional
factors could cause a claim to be considered a disease claim,218 including but not limited to the name of the
product, 219 citations to scientiﬁc journals, 220 and the use of certain pictures or symbols. 221 The FDA also
emphasized that disease claims need not be explicit, but could be implied.222 A claim is to evaluated based
on an “objective”223 assessment that is dependent on “the context and nature of the claim.”224
Rather than clarifying disease claims, the multi-factor, nebulous standard used by the FDA has resulted in
ﬁne and potentially arbitrary distinctions. As part of the promulgation of the ﬁnal rules, the FDA discussed
several examples distinguishing structure/function from disease claims. A claim of treating “joint pain” is
a disease claim because “joint pain” is a characteristic of arthritis.225 However, a claim of “helps support
cartilage and joint” would be a structure/function claim. 226 But not all claims of support are permissible.
A claim of “helps to maintain normal urine ﬂow in men over 50 years old” is impermissible as it implies the
treatment of benign prostatic hypertrophy.227 Citations to a journal article containing a disease name would
not be considered an implied disease claim. However, a prominent placement of the journal could be.228 A
statement that “a good diet promotes good death and prevents the onset of disease” is not a disease claim
while “Promotes good health and prevents the onset of disease” is. 229
The FDA’s examples provide the best evidence of the diﬃculties of drawing the boundary between struc-
ture/function and disease claims. However, the conditions targeted by lifestyle drugs are precisely those
21721 C.F.R. 101.93(g)(2)(iii)
21821 C.F.R. 101.93(g)(2)(iv)
21921 C.F.R. 101.93(g)(2)(iv)(A)
22021 C.F.R. 101.93(g)(2)(iv)(C)
22121 C.F.R. 101.93(g)(2)(iv)(E)
222Reg. of Struct. / Func., 65 Fed. Reg at 1013
223Id. at 1008
224Id. at 1006
225Id. at 1016
226Id. at 1017
227Id. at 1021
228Id. at 1024
229Id. at 1025
35conditions for which the distinctions between disease and structure/function are those that are most diﬃcult
to draw under the FDA’s guidelines. The FDA’s deﬁnition of disease is premised on “damage to an organ or
body” and draws a distinction between “healthy function and preventing or treating abnormal function”230
“Common conditions associated with natural states or processes that do not cause signiﬁcant or permanent
harm will not be treated as diseases.231 However, many of the conditions targeted by lifestyle drugs are
precisely the same “common conditions associated with” aging that is not deﬁned as a disease and would
presumably be a structure / function claim. Thus, the claims of dietary supplements (and by inclusion,
herbal remedies) can target the very same conditions targeted by lifestyle drugs. At most, one or two minor
semantic adjustments to the claim may all that is necessary.
To the extent that disease claims can be diﬀerentiated from structure or function claims, the diﬀerence
is unlikely to be perceived by consumers reading the labels. The FDA has discounted the possibility of
subjective interpretations of labels, stating that it “does not believe that market research studies are necessary
to provide a reasonable basis for the agency’s determinations concerning the meaning of labeling claims. The
agency has extensive experience in interpreting such claims.”232 The FDA, however, may be overly optimistic
in both the consumers’ ability in to decipher labels, as well as its own ability to discern consumer perception.
While the FDA has adopted an objective standard,233 use of and belief in herbal remedies may be dependent
on such subjective factors is personality and degree of social support.234 Indeed, one study using mock labels
to addressing precisely the structure / function versus disease distinction on labels has found that consumers
230Id. at 1019
231Id. at 1000
232Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the Eﬀect of the Product on the Structure or Function
of the Body, 65 Fed. Reg. 1000, 1007-08 (Jan. 6, 2000)
233See id.
234See Keiko Honda, & Judith S. Jacobson, Use of Complementary and Alternative Medicine among United States Adults:
the Inﬂuences of Personality, Coping Strategies, and Social Support, 40 Preventive Medicine 46, 46–53 (2005)
36do not diﬀerentiate between structure / function claims and disease claims; rather, consumer interpretation
of labels are dependent on the consumer’s existing beliefs.235
Herbal Remedies as the “Poor-Man’s” Lifestyle Drug
Lifestyle drugs have redeﬁned the pharmaceutical market by shifting the use of drugs from the treatment
disease, to the enhancement or maintenance of the quality of life. DTCA has suggested to the public of the
availability of a pill based solution to the enhancement of everyday life. At the same time, in the aftermath of
Vioxx, the public may place lower value on FDA approval. Instead, the ability to display publications from
scientiﬁc journals alongside dietary supplements at the point of sale may be suﬃcient to convince consumers
of the potency of the herbal remedy. Moreover, the structure/function versus disease distinction that has
separates drugs from dietary supplements is largely irrelevant in the lifestyle drugs market. The conﬂuence
of the eﬀects: DTCA, potential potency of herbal remedies, distrust of the FDA approval process, separating
structure/function claims from the types of conditions addressed by lifestyle drugs could all result in herbal
remedies becoming the “poor-man” lifestyle drug, used by those who wish to have the eﬀects of lifestyle
drugs, but either do not have the means, or do not wish to pay the cost of FDA approve pharmaceuticals.
General Policy Proposal: Shift Regulatory Emphasis from
Pre-Market Approval to Post-Marketing Removal
235See Karen R. France & Paula F. Bone, Policy Makers’ Paradigms and Evidence from Consumer Interpretations of Dietary
Supplement Labels, 39 J. Consumer Affairs 27, 47-49 (2005).
37The FDCA provides the FDA with regulatory responsibilities for drugs, and dietary supplements, but at the
same time, mandates a widely disparate regulatory regime for each. The justiﬁcation for disparate regulatory
treatment is tenuous in light of the converging markets and similar concerns of safety and potency. Moreover,
both lifestyle drugs and herbal remedies strain the limits of the pre-marketing approval process. For lifestyle
drugs, rare but serious adverse reactions could result in large absolute numbers of consumers being harmed.
However, pre-market testing is not feasible due to the practical constraints on the size of clinical trials.
For herbal remedies, the complexity of the chemical composition and natural variability in the product
may preclude clinical testing at the same standards as single-compound drugs. Post-marketing enforcement
provides an alternative to the binary choice of complete elimination from the market of such drugs and the
risky and chaotic world of caveat emptor.
The diﬀerence between lifestyle drugs and herbal remedies can be conceptualized as a diﬀerence in the
presumption of safety prior to marketing. Both need to satisfy some minimum level of safety prior to
marketing. For lifestyle drugs, the hurdle may be met through large, but manageable clinical trials. For
herbal remedies, at least traditional herbal remedies, the human experience may be suﬃcient. For both,
however, the initial presumption may be inaccurate. Neither clinical trials nor use by traditional cultures
are perfect models of the realities of widespread, frequent, and prolonged use in modern society. The
demographics of the users of a particular lifestyle drug or herbal remedy are likely to shift over time, given
the discretionary nature of the treatments. Interactions with other drugs or herbal remedies could create
complications. The presumption may simply be wrong. Post-marketing enforcement is therefore needed to
rectify such situations.
38Evaluation of Current Post-marketing Enforcement Provisions for Lifestyle Drugs
For lifestyle drugs, post-marketing eﬀorts are but an extension of the current regulatory regime for drugs.
The FDCA already provides the FDA with the authority to conditionally grant approval for a new drug,
subject to post-marketing studies and monitoring of adverse event reactions. The FDA, however, has not fully
utilized these provisions of the drug regulatory approval process, and has instead, focused on its eﬀorts on
pre-market approval. The explanation may be due in part to institutional inertia. The provisions authorizing
conditional post-marketing approval were added in 1997 and the FDA did not announce its guidance until
2001.236 Bureaucratic incentives also undoubtedly come into play. The withdrawal of a drug provides an
uncomfortable spotlight on the administrators who authorized approval. Post-hoc, hindsight analysis always
paints a poor picture and thus administrators are overly conservative in “type 2” errors (approving an unsafe
drug).237 However, despite these diﬃculties, the regulatory machinery is in place. What is needed is a change
in the mindset of not only FDA administrators, but also public understanding of the impossibility of total
safety and the ever potential for harm for all types of drugs. This mindset may gradually be shifting, due to
the popularity of lifestyle drugs. Lifestyle drugs highlight the impossibility of absolute safety; as the drug is
more widely, frequently, and chronically used, the sizes of clinical trials will need to increase to account for
growing heterogeneity. At some point, the pre-market trials will become infeasible.
Evaluation of Current Post-Marketing Removal Provisions for Herbal Remedies
Because, they are classiﬁed as dietary supplements, herbal remedies are subject at most to pre-market
notiﬁcation. While the DSHEA provides that a dietary supplement can be prohibited if it “presents a
236Notice of Availability Draft Guidance for Industry: Reports on the Status of Postmarketing Studies–Implementation of
Section 130 of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997; 66 Fed. Reg. 17912 (April 4, 2001)
237See Merrill, supra note 19 at 1798-99
39signiﬁcant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury,”238 ephedra has so far been the only dietary supplement
banned under this provision.239 Moreover, the experience with ephedra highlights the diﬃculties of post-
marketing enforcement under DSHEA. Despite initial FDA concerns about ephedra in the mid1990s, the
FDA was unable to issue a ﬁnal rule banning it until 2004. The use of voluntary AERs (adverse event
reports) was problematic as the reports were often inconsistent and incomplete, as both the GAO and the
RAND Corporation noted. Moreover, voluntary reporting has known subjective biases and tends to result
in underreporting of events.240
The limitations of AERs resulted in the diﬃculty of the FDA being able to meet its statutory burden of
proving that the a given herbal remedy is unsafe. Nutraceutical holds that the FDA must demonstrate that
a given dietary supplement is unsafe at all concentrations in order to ban the dietary supplement completely.
Thus, under DSHEA, the FDA’s post-enforcement powers over dietary supplements seem extremely limited.
Speciﬁc Proposal: Herbal Remedies Should Be Subject to Low Hurdles for
Pre-Marketing Approval but also Low Thresholds for Post-Market Removal
Herbal Remedies Should be Diﬀerentiated from Dietary Supplements
The need to regulate herbal remedies as something other than dietary supplements is perhaps self-evident in
the deﬁnition of dietary supplements. Dietary supplements are deﬁned as “(a) a vitamin, (b) a mineral, (c)
an herb or other botanical, (d) an amino acid, (e) a dietary substance for use by man to supplement the diet
23821 U.S.C. § 342(f)
239See Hutt., supra note 71 at 160-61
240See Uncertainties in Analyses Underlying FDA’s Proposed Rule on Ephedrine Alkaloids, supra note 130 at 35
40by increasing the total dietary intake; or (f) a concentrate, metabolite, constituent, extract, or combination
of any ingredient described [above.]”241 Herbs and botanicals, often contain a mixture of chemicals, and
are thus not well characterized. Vitamins, minerals, and amino acids, by comparison, are typically single-
entity compounds. The relative simplicity of vitamins, minerals, and amino acids permits their safety or
dangerousness to be readily determinable. Thus, vitamin, minerals, and amino acids are appropriately
regulated under DSHEA, as their simplicity permits the FDA to meet its burden of demonstrating a lack of
safety for removal. In contrast, the complexity of herbal extracts does not permit for as ready analysis.
Moreover, the standard for removing a dietary supplement from the market, “signiﬁcant or unreasonable
risk of illness or injury”242 is a new standard under DSHEA.243 Nutraceutical is the only case thus far the
address the deﬁnition of this standard. If the FDA’s burden of proof is as high as Nutraceutical suggests,
the FDA may be required to untangle all of the complexities and multitudes of potential interactions before
it is able to satisfy its burden. Given the near endless variety of ﬂora in the world, and the chemical variety
present in even a single plant, the FDA is relatively helpless in its ability to police herbal remedies through
post-market removal.
Herbal Remedies With Histories of Substantial Prior Human Use May Justify a Lower Threshold for Demon-
strating Pre-Market Safety
Herbal remedies, at least under DSHEA, are presumed safety until proven otherwise. For herbal remedies
that consist of “new dietary ingredients” all that the manufacturer need do is to submit is some evidence of
safety to the FDA. The presumption is perhaps not unfounded. Herbal remedies have had long traditions
24121 U.S.C. § 321(ﬀ)
24221 U.S.C. § 342(f)(1)
243See Hutt, supra note 71 at 160
41of use in many cultures around the world. The generations upon generations of use would likely screen out
many of the more harmful herbal remedies. Indeed, the herbal remedies may have even preceded human civ-
ilization. The use of plants as medicines has been observed in chimpanzees, and the medicinal properties of
plants may have evolved in conjunction with the evolution of animals. 244 Such evolution and selection could
provide an additional assurance in that herbal remedies, at least traditional herbal remedies, are relatively
benign.
Additional Power for Post-Market Removal of Herbal Remedies Balances the Demands of Protecting Safety
with the Demands of Providing Access to Health Care Options
The current regulation of herbal remedies under DSHEA is hampered by both the lack of pre-marketing
hurdles that permits dangerous products such as ephedra on the market, and at the failure to give adequate
power to the FDA to remove such products from the market. Additional hurdles prior to marketing is
not the ideal solution, as such hurdles could also keep herbal remedies that have proven safe histories from
the market. In addition, the use of herbal remedies as substitutes for lifestyle drugs suggests that the
requirement of pre-marketing would be ineﬀective, as the scale and scope of the clinical trials necessary to
demonstrate safety and eﬃcacy necessary to detect rare but serious adverse events would exceed feasibility.
For traditional herbal remedies, those that have had substantial prior human use, such preclinical testing
is also likely unnecessary. Providing FDA with the ﬂexibility to remove unsafe products from the market
would balance the competing needs for safety and for access to beneﬁcial remedies by enabling the FDA to
rectify situations where the presumption of safety of a herbal remedy is unfounded.
Implementation Issues
Implementation is the greatest diﬃculty with a post-marketing removal system. Post-marketing regulation
244See Benjamin L. Hart, The Evolution of Herbal Medicine: Behavioural Perspectives, 70 Anim, Behav. 975, 975-85 (2005)
42had been the original scheme for the regulation of food and drugs under the 1906 Act. The proposed
regulatory scheme therefore seems to be the regurgitation of an old, failed idea. Such regulation would
require active surveillance for adverse events reporting, which is subject to the numerous biases and gaps.
Moreover, post-marketing removal would likely require a substantial expansion of FDA resources and thus
draw criticism of the ever greater expansion and intrusion of government into the aﬀairs of private individuals,
and with the result of cumbersome constraints on individual autonomy and choice.
The implementation barriers are substantial, and are also critical to the feasibility of a post-marketing
regulatory regime. However, the barriers are not insurmountable. With better communication networks,
such as the internet, coupled the advent of computerized data processing, and statistical analysis, the adverse
reporting system has the potential to be ever more sensitive in detecting rare events and deciphering the
bias and statistical noise. The resource issues can potentially be addressed by requiring manufacturers of
herbal remedies to pay for regulation through user fees, analogous to the user fees in the approval process for
new drugs. These fees could be criticized for their eﬀect in limiting smaller businesses from the market for
herbal remedies. However, given the limited liability of corporations, some size limitation may be necessary
to provide incentives for self-policing of the safety herbal remedies. Larger corporations will be less likely to
be judgment proof and thus would take greater precautions to insure the safety of their product, as failure
to do could subject them to tort liability. Manufacturers who wish to assert the safety of herbal remedies
should be able to substantiate their believes with their capital.
An Additional Reason for Greater Post-Marketing Removal Power for Herbal Remedies:
43Unlocking the Value of Herbs
Traditional Herbal Medicines Show Great Promise in the Treatment of Disease
At the most basic level, traditional herbal medicines provide rich sources for new compounds that can be used
in initial screening step of drug discovery process. Pharmaceutical companies are under the constant pressure
to identify bioactive chemical compounds that may serve as drugs.245 The plants used in the traditional
medicines are theorized to have evolved to produce bioactive compounds; as plants are stationary, they
are heavily reliant on chemicals to ward oﬀ predators, and to otherwise interact with their environment.246
Furthermore, The history of medicine is replete with examples of powerful drugs that have been developed
from or derived from plants, including narcotics such as cocaine and opium,247 as well as anti-cancer agents
such as taxol.248 Indeed, up to one fourth of all prescription drugs are chemical compounds have been
derived from botanicals.249 The drug discovery process could be further enhanced by leveraging existing
knowledge of traditional herbal medicines. Such knowledge could further narrow the scope of the search for
drug compounds, as the conditions treated by the traditional medicine may suggest the target areas of an
herbal compound and therefore may provide a lead on for particular diseases.250
In addition to serving as a source for new drug compounds, traditional herbal medicines can potentially
245See e.g., Bhushan Patwardhan, World Health Organization Report: Traditional Medicine: Modern Approaches for Aﬀord-
able Global Health 121-123 (2005) available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/studies/B.Patwardhan2.pdf (describ-
ing the need for pharmaceutical companies to identify new compounds for drug targets)
246See e.g., Hart, supra note Error! Bookmark not deﬁned. at 981-85
247See Padwardhan, supra note 245 at 112
248See Gordon M. Cragg, David J. Newman, Plants as a Source of Anti-Cancer Agents, 100 J. Ethnopharm. 72, 72-75 (2005)
249See Charles R. McManis, The Interface Between International Intellectual Property and Environmental Protection, 76
Wash. U. L. Q. 255, 273 (1998)
250Huft supra note 12 at 1700-03
44be used to treat diseases directly. The precise identity of the active compounds or compounds, and the
mechanism through which the compounds act have often not been determined. Indeed, the eﬀect of the
medicine may not depend on the action of a single compound, but on the combined eﬀects of multiple
compounds. Furthermore, the plant used may not contain the active compound, but its precursor; or the
active compound may be a product of the preparation of the medicine or a metabolite of the precursor
compound. 251 Moreover, despite the lack of scientiﬁc characterization of some traditional medicines, the
use traditional medicines itself could suggest that issues of safety and eﬃcacy have been resolved through
the thousands of years of experience with the plants.
Failure of DSHEA to Harness the Potential of Traditional Herbal Medicines
On its face, DSHEA was a success for herbal remedies. After the passage of DSHEA, manufacturers could
bring their product to market, without having to undergo the extensive and expensive pre-market approval
process for drugs. However, DSHEA proved to be a double edged sword for the development of herbal
remedies and medicines. Even if a manufacturer could have proﬁtably subjected an herbal remedy to the
drug approval process, the availability of an alternative path to market meant that not only did performing
the necessary clinical trials to obtain approval have to be proﬁtable, but also that sale of the remedy as drug
was more proﬁtable than sale as a dietary supplement.
FDA’s Attempts to Adapt Drug Regulation to Herbal Remedies
The FDA has attempted to facilitate the use of herbals and botanicals as drugs by adapting the regulations
251See World Health Organization, Guidelines for the Appropriate Use of Herbal Medicines, 8.1.2 (1998); Guideline for
Industry, Botanical Products 5 (2004) available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/4592fnl.pdf
45of drugs to address some of the realities of herbal medicines. The FDA’s eﬀorts include adjusting the criteria
for inclusion in an OTC monograph to explicitly consider botanical drugs, publishing a guidance for industry
that interprets the requirements of for pre-market approval under a NDA for botanicals, and establishing
the Botanical Review Team to review the INDs for botanical drugs.
The FDA promulgated 21 C.F.R. 330.14 in 2002, which provided for the explicit consideration of botanical
products in an OTC monograph. The regulation deﬁnes “botanical drug substance” as “a drug substance
derived from one or more plants, algae, or macroscopic fungi, but does not include a highly puriﬁed or
chemically modiﬁed substance derived from such a source.”252 Moreover, the regulation requires that the
information useful for the characterization the botanical product be provided as part of the petition for
inclusion in a OTC monograph. The information requirements includes (a) botanical ingredient, including
growing conditions, supplier, harvest location and conditions, (b) qualitative descriptions such as name,
appearance, physical and chemical properties, and known active constituents, (c) quantitative descriptions
such as chemical constituents, and known active constituents, (d), type of manufacturing processes, and (e)
further processing.253
Of more practical signiﬁcance than the explicit approval of considering botanical products in OTC mono-
graphs is the consideration of foreign marketing experience. When the FDA established the OTC Drug
Review in 1972, it considered only drug’s marketing history within the United States in determining whether
the drug had been used for a material extent or time.254 Therefore, a traditional herbal medicine would
have been considered a “new drug” even if it had long history of use as a medicine in its native country or in
other countries. The FDA began to consider the inclusion of foreign marketing experience in the 1980s ,after
lobbying eﬀorts by European manufacturers of sunscreen, dental ingredients, and herbal products.255 The
25221 C.F.R. 330.14(a)
25321 C.F.R. 330.14(c)(4)
254See Pinco, supra note 40 at 107.
255See Pinco, supra note 40 at 108.
46FDA ﬁnally proposed to amend regulations to permit foreign marketing experience in 1996,256 issuing the
ﬁnal rule in 2002. 257 The use of foreign marketing experience can potentially provide a means for herbal
medicines to gain legitimacy without the added costs of clinical trails as the drug approval process in other
countries have validated and regulated herbal remedies as drugs. Data from the experiences of the herbal
remedy the those countries could therefore potentially be used to satisfy the GRAS/E and marketed for a
material time / extent eligibility requirements for inclusion into the OTC Drug review process.
Two years after the OTC Drug review process was eﬀectively opened for herbal remedies, the FDA, in
2004, published the Guidance for Industry, Botanical Product (the Guidance).258 The Guidance’s explicit
purpose is to describe the FDA’s current thinking on and recommendations for the approval of drugs based
on botanical products. As with all FDA guidances, it does not establish generally legally binding require-
ments. The Guidance deﬁnes “botanical product” to include plant materials, algae, macroscopic fungi, or
any combinations of botanical products, but excludes material from genetically modiﬁed botanical species,
fermentation products, highly puriﬁed substances, parts from animals, and vitamins and minerals. The Guid-
ance highlighted the eligibility of botanical products for inclusion in the OTC monograph system. However,
the primary contribution of the Guidance, was in clarifying the application of the NDA requirements to
botanical products.
For the requirements of the IND, the Guidance notes that ensuring a consistent manufacturing process poses
challenges in botanical products not present in a single compound drug. The raw botanical material is often
not completely characterized and is susceptible to contamination or deterioration. The clinical investigator
256See 61 Fed. Reg. 51625
257See 67 Fed. Reg. 3060.
258See Guidance for Industry, Botanical Products, supra note 251
47therefore should have appropriate quality controls for the botanical raw material.259 Furthermore, while
identiﬁcation of the active constituent is not necessary in the initial investigations, spectral analysis, chro-
matic ﬁngerprinting, and/or strength by dry weight should be used to insure batch consistency.260 Ideally,
a single source or batch should have suﬃcient quantities of the botanical product to sustain all the early
investigations; bridging studies should be used if multiple batches are unavoidable.261
While drugs derived from botanical products face increase quality control burdens, the requirements for
pre-clinical toxicity studies are somewhat lessened for Phase I and II studies.262 The Guidance notes that
for orally ingested botanical products with prior human experience, pre-clinical testing for pharmacology
and toxicity may not be needed.263 Botanical products that have been lawfully marketed as dietary sup-
plements in the United States and without known safety concerns generally would not require additional
pharmacological and toxicity studies.264 Furthermore, for such botanical products, the Guidance suggests
that would be little need for initial typical pilot Phase I studies, but instead “strongly encourage[s]” the
sponsor to pursue more deﬁnitive trials to determine eﬀectiveness.265 Even for products that have not been
legally marketed in the United States, the Guidance suggests that fewer safety trials may be necessary if
there is suﬃcient prior human experience.266
In contrast to Phase I and II studies, Phase III studies should be accompanied by additional toxicity data,
259See id. at 10-11
260See id. at 11
261See id. at 11-12
262See id. at 13
263See id. at 13
264See id. at 17
265See id. at 18
266See id. at 25-26
48regardless of whether the biological product has been lawfully marketed as a dietary supplement in the United
States or elsewhere.267 Furthermore, the burden characterizing and insuring the quality of the biological
product is fully borne in Phase III. While Phase I and II studies require only a rudimentary description of
the biological product, such as a description of the plant raw material and method of preparation,268 Phase
III studies are to be accompanied by a detailed documentation, including certiﬁcation of the harvest time
and location of the plant raw material, descriptions of the processing of the raw material, spectral analysis,
chromatic ﬁngerprinting, biological assays, analysis of heavy metals and pesticide residues.269
To facilitate review and approval of botanical drugs, the FDA established the Botanical Review Team in
2003, as a division of the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER).270 In addition, in June,
2004, the FDA published policies and procedures for the review botanical drugs as guidelines for the team.271
The guidelines noted that botanical drugs have special features such as “complex mixtures, lack of a distinct
active ingredient, substantial prior human uses,” that “require consideration during the review processes.”272
The stated goals of the Botanical Review Team include serving as the expert resource within the CDER all
in issues related to botanical drugs, participating in the application and approval of all botanical drugs, and
coordinating with external groups to develop the knowledge and understanding of botanical drugs.273 The
Botanical Review Team thus suggests the FDA’s desire to adapt its NDA process for botanical drugs by
providing specialized consideration for them.
267See id. at 27
268See id. at 13-16
269See id. at 28-32
270See Mark Blumenthal , Botanical Products Team Established by FDA to Review New Products, 58 HerbalGram 17 (2003)
available at http://www.herbalgram.org/iherb/herbalgram/articleview.asp?a=2520
271Oﬃce of New Drugs, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Review of Botanical Drug Products, Manual of Policies
and Procedures, 6007.1 (June 7, 2004)
272See id. at 1
273About the Botanical Review Team, http://www.fda.gov/cder/Oﬃces/ODE V BRT/default.htm
49The Failure of the FDA’s Herbal Eﬀorts
The FDA’s attempts to encourage the submission of herbal supplements for approval as drugs have largely
failed. While the Guidance notes that several botanical products, cascara, psyllium, and senna, have been
included in the OTC Drug Review,274 these cited botanicals were included in the OTC Drug Review prior
to the eﬀorts of FDA to incorporate botanical products into OTC monographs. The FDA also acknowledged
that none of the currently marketed prescription drugs are botanical products.275
The failure of the FDA’s attempts is not surprising. As a result of DSHEA, A manufacturer of traditional
herbal medicines is confronted with a regulatory scheme oﬀering a bi-polar choice, between having its prod-
ucts regulated as drugs or as dietary supplements. The choice then is stark. Drugs are subject to FDA
pre-market approval with the manufacturer bearing the burden for safety and eﬀectiveness; dietary supple-
ments are subject only to pre-market notiﬁcation. Drugs require the manufacturer to conduct extensive,
multi-phase clinical trials; dietary supplements require only that the manufacturer have “substantiation” of
the claims.
The costs of drug development are staggering, due in large part of meeting the requirements to obtain FDA
approval. One estimate places the direct costs to bring a single drug to market have been estimated at over
$400 million.276 An average of than 7.5 years elapses between initial clinical trials and FDA approval.277
When the costs are capitalized to account for the length of the approval process, the estimated costs exceed
274See Guidance for Industry, Botanical Products, supra note 251 at 6
275See Botanical Review Team, http://www.fda.gov/cder/Oﬃces/ODE V BRT/botanicalDrug.htm
276See Joseph A. Dimasi et. al, The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. Health Econ.
151, 166(2003)
277See id. at 164-165
50$800 million.278 Phase I alone costs an average of $15.2 million; the average Phase III study costs $86.3
million. In addition to the costs is the risk: only 31.4% of compounds entering Phase I complete Phase
III. Another study has suggested that the cost is even higher, at $863 million, but found that costs vary
substantially from under half a billion to over $2 billion, depending on the disease and the pharmaceutical
company.279
While the costs are already enormous for traditional, single chemical entity pharmaceuticals, the costs
could be even higher for non-puriﬁed herbal extracts under the FDA’s Guidance for Industry. To obtain
approval, the manufacturer would have to ensure consistency and quality by ultimately conducting chemical
characterizations of markers. Given the eﬀect of variability in soil conditions, harvesting, and storage, among
other factors, bioassays chemical characterizations are likely not feasible, especially if the active chemical
compound is unknown.280 With the additional requirements for herbal medicines, the development of a drug
from an herbal extract is more complex and thus more expensive than development from a single chemical
entity. While the FDA’s objective in setting for the Guidance was to encourage the development of new
herbal drugs, it’s eﬀect was to most likely do the exact opposite.
The combined eﬀects of a the extensive regulation as drugs and the minimal regulation as dietary supplements
has ensured that traditional herbal medicines would rarely be developed into full-ﬂedged drugs, but rather,
would mostly be relegated to the nebulous realm of dietary supplements.
278See id. at 166
279See Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug Development, Is it Really $802 Million?,
25 Health Affairs 420, 427 (2006)
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51Intellectual Property Concerns of Herbal Remedies
The initial ﬁxed costs of drug development are coupled with the relatively low marginal costs of the production
of the drug. Even if there were no regulatory costs to drug development, substantial search costs would need
to be expended to research and identify eﬀective drugs. Given the relative ease with which a competitor
can free-ride oﬀ the research and development by merely coping a drug, manufacturers must rely on patent
protection to capture the beneﬁts stemming from their research and to compensate them for their initial
expenditures. Without such protection, drug development would be unproﬁtable, as the manufacturer will
be unlikely to capture suﬃcient beneﬁts to recoup their research investment.
In the case of herbal remedies, the patent protection aﬀorded for herbal medicines is substantially weaker
than for traditional chemical compounds. Patents can be granted for “any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement.”281 Patents, however, are
unavailable for products of nature.282 Thus. a manufacturer of an herbal remedy would not be able to patent
the underlying plant from which the remedy is made. Herbal remedies, however, are not automatically
excluded from all patent protection. The precise contours of what is a product of nature has not been
established. 283 Thus, a manufacturer could potentially genetically modify the herb in order to patent it.
Even if the plant itself cannot be patented, the method of extracting the chemicals can be.284 And the patent
may also be granted for the use of the extract – i.e. treatment of a speciﬁc disease.285 However, while there
is some patent protection for herbal remedies, the degree of protection is less than that for a new chemical
28135 U.S.C. § 101(a)
282Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)
283See id. at 310 (strain of oil-eating bacteria was found not to be a product of nature as genetic engineering had altered its
characteristics suﬃciently such that the bacteria were markedly diﬀerent from any found in nature); cf. Funk Bros. Seed Co.
v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948)
284See e.g., Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co., 179 F. 701, 705 (7th Cir. 1910)
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52compound because unlike the chemical compound, the plant itself may not be patentable. A competitor
may therefore be able to circumvent the patent protections by utilizing a diﬀerent method of processing the
plant, or suggesting its use for another condition.
An additional hurdle for herbal remedies exists in the novelty requirements for patentability. The novelty
requirement denies the issuance of a patent if the invention had been “described in a printed publication”
in any country.286 Because many traditional herbal remedies have long histories of use, and the remedies
may already be previously be published and thus fail to meet the novelty requirement. A patent for an
herbal remedy therefore stands a greater risk for being invalidated on the basis, as a competitor may be able
to shift through old medicinal texts to ﬁnd a prior publication. Again, the precise contours of the bar to
patentability on account of prior publication are uncertain.287 And the degree of overall patent protection
for herbal remedies is debatable.288 However, the greater uncertainty of patent protection entails greater
risks for manufacturers of herbal remedies. To compensate for these greater risks, manufacturers require a
greater reward from their investment.
The issue of the patentability of traditional herbal medicines also raises the question of the ownership of
traditional herbal medicines. The commericialization of drugs based on traditional herbal medicines has
recently raised legal, ethical, and moral concerns of “biopiracy” - the exploitation of the natural resources
of other cultures and countries.289 Concerns of biopiracy can be addressed through such mechanisms as
such as assigning any patent rights to the country of origin of the traditional medicine, or providing for
28635 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b)
287See e.g., Huft, supra note 12at 1718-21
288See Liz Hanellin, Note, Protecting Plant-Derived Drugs: Patents and Beyond, 10 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 169, 189
(1991) (arguing that current patent protection is insuﬃcient for plant derived medicines); cf. 12at n9 (suggesting that patent
laws provides patent protection for plant-derived medicines)
289See e.g., David Conforto, Traditional and Modern-Day Biopiracy: Redeﬁning the Biopiracy Debate, 19 J. Envtl. L. &
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53joint ownership of the whatever patents over the herbal remedy.290 However, such measures entail both
transactions costs, e.g. negotiations with foreign governments, and as operational costs, e.g., royalties for
the license to manufacture and market drugs derived from traditional herbal medicines.
Regulatory Proposals for Herbal Remedies
Due to the high hurdles to drug approval, and the potential for lowered returns from diminished patent
protection, several articles have suggested an alternative regulatory scheme for herbal medicines. Some have
suggested that the FDA lower the standards for the approval of traditional herbal medicines, as herbal
medicines have meaningful diﬀerences, including substantial history of prior human use and complex and
synergistic chemical constituents that are not readily amenable to analysis under current clinical trial de-
signs.291 Others have pointed to European nations as models for reform, where herbal drugs are evaluated
and approved by a separate department creates the specialization and expertise necessary to evaluate the
safety and eﬃcacy of herbal-based drugs.292 Still others call for a more active FDA role in determining the
safety and eﬀectiveness of herbal remedies, with the FDA establishing advisory boards to review the safety
290See e.g., id. at 389-91 (describing partnership with third-world governments as a solution to biopiarcy); Huft supra note 12
at 1721-29 (describing the possibility of joint-ownership for traditional herbal remedies between indigenous peoples and Western
corporations)
291See e.g., Lei, supra note 9 at 136-39 (proposing that the FDA lower its approval hurdle for herbal drugs based on traditional
medicines); Debra D. Burke & Anderson P. Page, Regulating the Dietary Supplements Industry: Something Still Needs to
Change, 1 Hastings Bus. L.J. 121, 145-50 (2005) (suggesting that dietary supplements manufacturers conduct Phase I testing
prior to marketing)
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54of herbals, in the same way that the OTC Drug Review Process evaluated the safety of existing OTC drugs.
293
Proposals for treating herbal medicines separately from traditional, singlecompound entities, of course, pre-
supposes that there is a diﬀerence between “nature” and “synthetic.” This distinction is untenable in some
circumstances, as many of the chemical compounds used in modern drugs are identical to those found in
plants. Indeed, plants produce powerful and illegal narcotics such as cocaine and opium. The lowering
of pre-marketing standards could create consumer confusing by providing hierarchies of safety, with not
only a “gold” standard of FDA approval, but also a “silver” and “bronze.”294 In addition, reducing the
scientiﬁc rigor of clinical trials would only serve to impede the scientiﬁc understanding of herbal medicines.
If anything, the scientiﬁc studies will be more uncertain, and the complexities of herbal medicines will remain
unexplored.
The issue has been cast as one of weighing consumer protection and consumer choice, between preventing
the consumer from acting on potentially inaccurate assumptions of the safety of “natural” or “traditional”
products and permitting the consumer to judge for him or herself. While there will always tension between
protection and choice, there is perhaps greater room for comprise when post-marketing options are also
considered. Concerns arising from lowered pre-marketing approval hurdle can be partially alleviated by
permitting a more aggressive post-marketing removal. Some premarketing approval hurdle may still be
necessary, such as basic toxicity studies in animals. However, the use of aggressive-post marketing removal
293Cary E. Zuck, Herbal Remedies Are Not Dietary Supplements: A Proposal For Regulatory Reform, 11 Hastings Women’s
L.J. 29, 49-57 (2000)
294See Margaret Gilhooley, Herbal Remedies and Dietary Supplements, the Boundaries of Drug Claims and Freedom of Choice,
49 Fla. L. Rev. 665, 717-20 (1997)
55will insure the proper balance between safety and access, and leverage the potentially thousands of years of
experience that traditional cultures have had with herbal remedies.
Aggressive post-market approval could also resolve the intellectually property barriers to the research and
development of herbal drugs. Removal of herbal remedies need not be based on issues of safety alone. The
FDA could perhaps be permitted to award the manufacturers who ﬁrst characterize the active compounds or
convincingly demonstrate the safety and eﬃcacy of a herbal drug (perhaps to the degree of rigor necessary
to gain approval as a single-compound entity) the exclusive right to market the drug, and remove of other
herbal drugs containing crude preparations of the active compound. In the alternative, the FDA could
perhaps require competing manufacturers to license from the discoverer, in order to continue marketing.
Such a regime would provide for the incentive to conduct research and gain better scientiﬁc understanding
of an herbal remedy. Moreover, if the herbal drug was developed from a traditional herbal medicine, the
centralization of property rights in a manufacturer would create a pool of funds that could be more easily
shared with the origin of the traditional medicine and thereby address concerns of biopiracy.
56Conclusions
Under the current statutory scheme of the FDCA is hampered by its emphasis and focus at the point of
marketing. The regulation of drugs in the FDCA has been one of shifting emphasis on the hurdle necessary
to permit marketing. With the 1906 Act, the hurdle was non-existent. After the inadequacy of enforcement
of the 1906 became apparent, the 1938 FDCA Act erected the hurdle of a pre-notiﬁcation. The 1962
amendments raised the hurdle yet higher, by requiring pre-market notiﬁcation.
The history of the FDA has neglected post-marketing removal as a regulatory solution. When the FDA
attempted to bring vitamins and minerals into the purview of pre-market approval by classifying potent
formulations as drugs or food additives, Congress reacted, perhaps harshly, by enacting DSHEA, which
created a polar regulatory scheme between drugs and dietary supplements.
The desirability of greater post-marketing regulation was perhaps further highlighted by the safety recalls
of Vioxx and Ephedra. Despite stark diﬀerences in regulatory regimes, one common lesson from the recalls
was the need for greater postmarketing activity. The desirability of post-marketing regulations for lifestyle
drugs and herbal remedies is further suggested by their converging markets. Lifestyle drugs have created
demand for the treatment of widespread and chronic conditions that lie at the boundary of therapy and
enhancement. Herbal remedies have also gained widespread popularity and may have come to be viewed as
a cheaper substitute for lifestyle drugs.
The widespread use of lifestyle drugs, both in the breadth of the population as well as the frequency and
duration has demonstrated the limits of pre-market approval clinical trials in coping rare but severe adverse
57side eﬀects. The only solution is for greater post-marketing regulation. The parallel growth of the use
of herbs for similar conditions as lifestyle drugs suggests the conceptual diﬀerences between lifestyle drugs
and herbal remedies are minor. The diﬀerence is one of presumption at prior to marketing, with a lifestyle
drug being presumed safe only after clinical trials have been conducted, and a herbal remedy assumed safe,
especially it has been used by a traditional culture. However, for both, the relatively high degree of error in
the initial presumptions suggests the need for aggressive post-marketing enforcement to rectify those errors.
The current drug regulations are adequate and adaptable to increasing postmarketing enforcement for lifestyle
drugs. However, herbal remedies require a diﬀerent regulatory category, one with lower pre-marketing hurdles
than drugs, but also a lower threshold for post-marketing removal. Such a regulation system could also have
the added beneﬁt of addressing the issue of the intellectual property of natural herbal medicines, and thus
remove a signiﬁcant impediments to unlocking their full value.
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